Description
An integer overflow existed in the wolfCrypt CMAC implementation, that could be exploited to forge CMAC tags. The function wc_CmacUpdate used the guard if (cmac->totalSz != 0) to skip XOR-chaining on the first block (where digest is all-zeros and the XOR is a no-op). However, totalSz is word32 and wraps to zero after 2^28 block flushes (4 GiB), causing the guard to erroneously discard the live CBC-MAC chain state. Any two messages sharing a common suffix beyond the 4 GiB mark then produce identical CMAC tags, enabling a zero-work prefix-substitution forgery. The fix removes the guard, making the XOR unconditional; the no-op property on the first block is preserved because digest is zero-initialized by wc_InitCmac_ex.
References
Affected packages
wolfssl (5.9.0@nixos-25.11, 5.9.0@nixos-unstable)
Description
An integer overflow existed in the wolfCrypt CMAC implementation, that could be exploited to forge CMAC tags. The function wc_CmacUpdate used the guard
if (cmac->totalSz != 0)to skip XOR-chaining on the first block (where digest is all-zeros and the XOR is a no-op). However, totalSz is word32 and wraps to zero after 2^28 block flushes (4 GiB), causing the guard to erroneously discard the live CBC-MAC chain state. Any two messages sharing a common suffix beyond the 4 GiB mark then produce identical CMAC tags, enabling a zero-work prefix-substitution forgery. The fix removes the guard, making the XOR unconditional; the no-op property on the first block is preserved because digest is zero-initialized by wc_InitCmac_ex.References
Affected packages
wolfssl(5.9.0@nixos-25.11, 5.9.0@nixos-unstable)