Hi Everyone,
I am exploring support for vendor-defined PKCS#11 mechanisms based on a device Hardware Unique Key (HUK).
While working on this, I noticed that OP-TEE already relies on the HUK for secure storage key derivation and encryption. However, I could not
find any support for creating PKCS#11 key objects derived from the HUK and using them for standard cryptographic operations such as encryption,
decryption, signing, or verification.
Before proposing any design or upstream contribution, I would like to understand whether this omission is intentional and if there are
security, architectural, or portability concerns behind it.
Some questions I had are:
- Is the HUK intentionally restricted to internal OP-TEE services such as secure storage?
- Are there security concerns with allowing PKCS#11 applications to use HUK-derived keys for cryptographic operations?
- Are there portability concerns due to platform-specific HUK implementations?
- Has a HUK-backed PKCS#11 key mechanism been discussed previously?
My motivation is to enable device-specific keys derived from the HUK to be used through standard PKCS#11 operations while ensuring that the actual key material is never exposed, imported, exported, or stored outside the secure environment.
I would appreciate any background on previous discussions or design decisions around this area.
Thanks.
Hi Everyone,
I am exploring support for vendor-defined PKCS#11 mechanisms based on a device Hardware Unique Key (HUK).
While working on this, I noticed that OP-TEE already relies on the HUK for secure storage key derivation and encryption. However, I could not
find any support for creating PKCS#11 key objects derived from the HUK and using them for standard cryptographic operations such as encryption,
decryption, signing, or verification.
Before proposing any design or upstream contribution, I would like to understand whether this omission is intentional and if there are
security, architectural, or portability concerns behind it.
Some questions I had are:
My motivation is to enable device-specific keys derived from the HUK to be used through standard PKCS#11 operations while ensuring that the actual key material is never exposed, imported, exported, or stored outside the secure environment.
I would appreciate any background on previous discussions or design decisions around this area.
Thanks.