Skip to content

Question: Rationale for not exposing HUK-derived keys through PKCS#11 mechanisms #7969

Description

@bashadarsi

Hi Everyone,

I am exploring support for vendor-defined PKCS#11 mechanisms based on a device Hardware Unique Key (HUK).

While working on this, I noticed that OP-TEE already relies on the HUK for secure storage key derivation and encryption. However, I could not
find any support for creating PKCS#11 key objects derived from the HUK and using them for standard cryptographic operations such as encryption,
decryption, signing, or verification.

Before proposing any design or upstream contribution, I would like to understand whether this omission is intentional and if there are
security, architectural, or portability concerns behind it.

Some questions I had are:

  • Is the HUK intentionally restricted to internal OP-TEE services such as secure storage?
  • Are there security concerns with allowing PKCS#11 applications to use HUK-derived keys for cryptographic operations?
  • Are there portability concerns due to platform-specific HUK implementations?
  • Has a HUK-backed PKCS#11 key mechanism been discussed previously?

My motivation is to enable device-specific keys derived from the HUK to be used through standard PKCS#11 operations while ensuring that the actual key material is never exposed, imported, exported, or stored outside the secure environment.

I would appreciate any background on previous discussions or design decisions around this area.

Thanks.

Metadata

Metadata

Assignees

No one assigned

    Labels

    No labels
    No labels

    Type

    No type

    Projects

    No projects

    Milestone

    No milestone

    Relationships

    None yet

    Development

    No branches or pull requests

    Issue actions