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SOC/CSIRT management:

This page deals with SOC and CERT management

Table of Contents

Must read

Articles/recordings

Challenges

Generic ones

As per the aforementioned article, here are some typical challenges for a SOC/CSIRT:

image

After pandemic

As per the aforementioned article, I recommend to keep in mind the following common challenges:

image

SOC organization

Tiering or not tiering?

  • No real need for tiering (L1/L2/L3)

    • this is an old model for service provider, not necesserarily for a SOC!
    • as per MITRE paper (p65):

    In this book, the constructs of “tier 1” and “tier 2+” are sometimes used to describe analysts who are primarily responsible for front-line alert triage and in-depth investigation/analysis/ response, respectively. However, not all SOCs are arranged in this manner. In fact, some readers of this book are probably very turned off by the idea of tiering at all [38]. Some industry experts have outright called tier 1 as “dead” [39]. Once again, every SOC is different, and practitioners can sometimes be divided on the best way to structure operations. SOCs which do not organize in tiers may opt for an organizational structure more based on function. Many SOCs that have more than a dozen analysts find it necessary and appropriate to tier analysis in response to these goals and operational demands. Others do not and yet still succeed, both in terms of tradecraft maturity and repeatability in operations. Either arrangement can succeed if by observing the following tips that foreshadow a longer conversation about finding and nurturing staff in “Strategy 4: Hire AND Grow Quality Staff.”

    Highly effective SOCs enable their staff to reach outside their assigned duties on a routine basis, regardless of whether they use “tier” to describe their structure.

SOC teams

  • Instead of tiering, 3 different teams should be needed, based on experience:
    • security monitoring team (which does actually the "job" of detecting security incident being fully autonomous)
    • security monitoring engineering team (which fixes/improves security monitoring like SIEM rules and SOA playbooks, generates reportings, helps with uncommon use cases handling)
    • build / project management team (which does tools integration, SIEM data ingestion, specific DevOps tasks, project management).

SOC shifts for 24*7

  • There is a huge difference between "on-call" and "24x7":

    • "on-call" service is supposed to handle pre-validated types of alerts, with maximum severity and urgency.
    • "24x7" service is supposed to provide same quality of service, no matter the time of day and date it is (night, WE, holidays).
  • Here is an example of teams shifts to really achieve "24x7": image

Source: LinkedIn article

RACI

  • Define a RACI, above all if you contract with an MSSP.

CSIRT organization

  • Designate among team analysts:
    • triage officer;
    • incident handler;
    • incident manager;
    • deputy CERT manager.
  • Generally speaking, follow best practices as described in ENISA's ("Good practice for incident management", see "Must read")

TTP (attack methods) knowledge base reference

  • Use MITRE ATT&CK
  • Document all detections (SIEM Rules, etc.) using MITRE ATT&CK ID, whenever possible.

Data quality and management

  • Implement an information model, like the Splunk CIM one:
    • do not hesitate to extend it, depending on your needs
    • make sure this datamodel is being implemented in the SIEM, SIRP, SOA and even TIP.

Key documents for a SOC

  • Document an audit policy, that is tailored of the detection needs/expectations of the SOC:
  • Document a detection strategy, tailored to the needs and expectations regarding the SOC capabilities.
    • The document will aim at listing the detection rules (SIEM searches, for instance), with key examples of results, and an overview of handling procedures.
  • Document and keep up-to-date a detection matrix, which aims at representing the detection capabilities, for designated (feared) events and as per the security sensors known capabilities.

Detection quality assessment

Detection capabilities representation

Standard for security technologies

  • Use Security Stack Mappings to picture detection capabilities for a given security solution/environment (like AWS, Azure, NDR, etc.):

SOC detection capabilities simplified view

Response capabilities representation :

Response simplified view

  • Leverage the RE&CT framework to drive generic and fundamental containment actions.

Global self-assessment

Generic / compliance assessment

  • Pick-up a security standard and run an assessment thanks to CISO Assistant

SOC Self-assessment

CERT/CSIRT self-assessment

To go further

Priorities

  • Define SOC priorities, with feared events and offensive scenarios (TTP) to be monitored, as per risk analysis results.

Detections enhancements

  • Leverage machine learning, wherever it can be relevant in terms of good ratio false positives / real positives.
    • My recommendations: be careful, try not to saturate SOC consoles with FP, and don't forget to grab the required context to be able to analyze (verify) the detection!

Leverage best practices:

  • Make sure to follow the 11 strategies for a (world class) SOC, as per MITRE paper (see Must Read).

Follow the security industry standards:

End

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