The principle characteristics of crosvm are:
- A process per virtual device, made using fork on Linux
- Each process is sandboxed using minijail
- Support for several CPU architectures, operating systems, and hypervisors
- Written in Rust for security and safety
A typical session of crosvm starts in main.rs
where command line parsing is done to build up a
Config
structure. The Config
is used by run_config
in src/crosvm/sys/unix.rs
to setup and
execute a VM. Broken down into rough steps:
- Load the Linux kernel from an ELF or bzImage file.
- Create a handful of control sockets used by the virtual devices.
- Invoke the architecture-specific VM builder
Arch::build_vm
(located inx86_64/src/lib.rs
,aarch64/src/lib.rs
, orriscv64/src/lib.rs
). Arch::build_vm
will create aRunnableLinuxVm
to represent a virtual machine instance.create_devices
creates every PCI device, including the virtio devices, that were configured inConfig
, along with matching minijail configs for each.Arch::assign_pci_addresses
assigns an address to each PCI device, prioritizing devices that report a preferred slot by implementing thePciDevice
trait'spreferred_address
function.Arch::generate_pci_root
, using a list of every PCI device with optionalMinijail
, will finally jail the PCI devices and construct aPciRoot
that communicates with them.- Once the VM has been built, it's contained within a
RunnableLinuxVm
object that is used by the VCPUs and control loop to service requests until shutdown.
During the device creation routine, each device will be created and then wrapped in a ProxyDevice
which will internally fork
(but not exec
) and minijail the device, while dropping it for the
main process. The only interaction that the device is capable of having with the main process is via
the proxied trait methods of BusDevice
, shared memory mappings such as the guest memory, and file
descriptors that were specifically allowed by that device's security policy. This can lead to some
surprising behavior to be aware of such as why some file descriptors which were once valid are now
invalid.
Every sandbox is made with minijail and starts with create_sandbox_minijail
in jail
crate
which set some very restrictive settings. Linux namespaces and seccomp filters are used for
sandboxing. Each seccomp policy can be found under jail/seccomp/{arch}/{device}.policy
and should
start by @include
-ing the common_device.policy
. With the exception of architecture specific
devices (such as Pl030
on ARM or I8042
on x86_64), every device will need a different policy for
each supported architecture.
For the operations that devices need to perform on the global VM state, such as mapping into guest memory address space, there are the VM control sockets. There are a few kinds, split by the type of request and response that the socket will process. This also proves basic security privilege separation in case a device becomes compromised by a malicious guest. For example, a rogue device that is able to allocate MSI routes would not be able to use the same socket to (de)register guest memory. During the device initialization stage, each device that requires some aspect of VM control will have a constructor that requires the corresponding control socket. The control socket will get preserved when the device is sandboxed and the other side of the socket will be waited on in the main process's control loop.
The socket exposed by crosvm with the --socket
command line argument is another form of the VM
control socket. Because the protocol of the control socket is internal and unstable, the only
supported way of using that resulting named unix domain socket is via crosvm command line
subcommands such as crosvm stop
or programmatically via the crosvm_control
library.
GuestMemory
and its friends VolatileMemory
, VolatileSlice
, MemoryMapping
, and
SharedMemory
, are common types used throughout crosvm to interact with guest memory. Know which
one to use in what place using some guidelines
GuestMemory
is for sending around references to all of the guest memory. It can be cloned freely, but the underlying guest memory is always the same. Internally, it's implemented usingMemoryMapping
andSharedMemory
. Note thatGuestMemory
is mapped into the host address space (for non-protected VMs), but it is non-contiguous. Device memory, such as mapped DMA-Bufs, are not present inGuestMemory
.SharedMemory
wraps amemfd
and can be mapped usingMemoryMapping
to access its data.SharedMemory
can't be cloned.VolatileMemory
is a trait that exposes generic access to non-contiguous memory.GuestMemory
implements this trait. Use this trait for functions that operate on a memory space but don't necessarily need it to be guest memory.VolatileSlice
is analogous to a Rust slice, but unlike those, aVolatileSlice
has data that changes asynchronously by all those that reference it. Exclusive mutability and data synchronization are not available when it comes to aVolatileSlice
. This type is useful for functions that operate on contiguous shared memory, such as a single entry from a scatter gather table, or for safe wrappers around functions which operate on pointers, such as aread
orwrite
syscall.MemoryMapping
is a safe wrapper around anonymous and file mappings. Provides RAII and does munmap after use. Access via Rust references is forbidden, but indirect reading and writing is available viaVolatileSlice
and several convenience functions. This type is most useful for mapping memory unrelated toGuestMemory
.
See memory layout for details how crosvm arranges the guest address space.
The root of the crosvm device model is the Bus
structure and its friend the BusDevice
trait. The
Bus
structure is a virtual computer bus used to emulate the memory-mapped I/O bus and also I/O
ports for x86 VMs. On a read or write to an address on a VM's bus, the corresponding Bus
object is
queried for a BusDevice
that occupies that address. Bus
will then forward the read/write to the
BusDevice
. Because of this behavior, only one BusDevice
may exist at any given address. However,
a BusDevice
may be placed at more than one address range. Depending on how a BusDevice
was
inserted into the Bus
, the forwarded read/write will be relative to 0 or to the start of the
address range that the BusDevice
occupies (which would be ambiguous if the BusDevice
occupied
more than one range).
Only the base address of a multi-byte read/write is used to search for a device, so a device
implementation should be aware that the last address of a single read/write may be outside its
address range. For example, if a BusDevice
was inserted at base address 0x1000 with a length of
0x40, a 4-byte read by a VCPU at 0x39 would be forwarded to that BusDevice
.
Each BusDevice
is reference counted and wrapped in a mutex, so implementations of BusDevice
need
not worry about synchronizing their access across multiple VCPUs and threads. Each VCPU will get a
complete copy of the Bus
, so there is no contention for querying the Bus
about an address. Once
the BusDevice
is found, the Bus
will acquire an exclusive lock to the device and forward the
VCPU's read/write. The implementation of the BusDevice
will block execution of the VCPU that
invoked it, as well as any other VCPU attempting access, until it returns from its method.
Most devices in crosvm do not implement BusDevice
directly, but some are examples are i8042
and
Serial
. With the exception of PCI devices, all devices are inserted by architecture specific code
(which may call into the architecture-neutral arch
crate). A BusDevice
can be proxied to a
sandboxed process using ProxyDevice
, which will create the second process using a fork, with no
exec.
In order to use the more complex PCI bus, there are a couple adapters that implement BusDevice
and
call into a PciRoot
with higher level calls to config_space_read
/config_space_write
. The
PciConfigMmio
is a BusDevice
for insertion into the MMIO Bus
for ARM devices. For x86_64,
PciConfigIo
is inserted into the I/O port Bus
. There is only one implementation of PciRoot
that is used by either of the PciConfig*
structures. Because these devices are very simple, they
have very little code or state. They aren't sandboxed and are run as part of the main process.
The PciRoot
, analogous to BusDevice
for Bus
s, contains all the PciDevice
trait objects.
Because of a shortcut (or hack), the ProxyDevice
only supports jailing BusDevice
traits.
Therefore, PciRoot
only contains BusDevice
s, even though they also implement PciDevice
. In
fact, every PciDevice
also implements BusDevice
because of a blanket implementation
(impl<T: PciDevice> BusDevice for T { … }
). There are a few PCI related methods in BusDevice
to
allow the PciRoot
to still communicate with the underlying PciDevice
(yes, this abstraction is
very leaky). Most devices will not implement PciDevice
directly, instead using the
VirtioPciDevice
implementation for virtio devices, but the xHCI (USB) controller is an example
that implements PciDevice
directly. The VirtioPciDevice
is an implementation of PciDevice
that
wraps a VirtioDevice
, which is how the virtio specified PCI transport is adapted to a transport
agnostic VirtioDevice
implementation.
The VirtioDevice
is the most widely implemented trait among the device traits. Each of the
different virtio devices (block, rng, net, etc.) implement this trait directly and they follow a
similar pattern. Most of the trait methods are easily filled in with basic information about the
specific device, but activate
will be the heart of the implementation. It's called by the virtio
transport after the guest's driver has indicated the device has been configured and is ready to run.
The virtio device implementation will receive the run time related resources (GuestMemory
,
Interrupt
, etc.) for processing virtio queues and associated interrupts via the arguments to
activate
, but activate
can't spend its time actually processing the queues. A VCPU will be
blocked as long as activate
is running. Every device uses activate
to launch a worker thread
that takes ownership of run time resources to do the actual processing. There is some subtlety in
dealing with virtio queues, so the smart thing to do is copy a simpler device and adapt it, such as
the rng device (rng.rs
).
Because of the multi-process nature of crosvm, communication is done over several IPC primitives.
The common ones are shared memory pages, unix sockets, anonymous pipes, and various other file
descriptor variants (DMA-buf, eventfd, etc.). Standard methods (read
/write
) of using these
primitives may be used, but crosvm has developed some helpers which should be used where applicable.
Most threads in crosvm will have a wait loop using a WaitContext
, which is a wrapper around a
epoll
on Linux and WaitForMultipleObjects
on Windows. In either case, waitable objects can be
added to the context along with an associated token, whose type is the type parameter of
WaitContext
. A call to the wait
function will block until at least one of the waitable objects
has become signaled and will return a collection of the tokens associated with those objects. The
tokens used with WaitContext
must be convertible to and from a u64
. There is a custom derive
#[derive(EventToken)]
which can be applied to an enum
declaration that makes it easy to use your
own enum in a WaitContext
.
The limitations of WaitContext
on Linux are the same as the limitations of epoll
. The same FD
can not be inserted more than once, and the FD will be automatically removed if the process runs out
of references to that FD. A dup
/fork
call will increment that reference count, so closing the
original FD will not actually remove it from the WaitContext
. It is possible to receive tokens
from WaitContext
for an FD that was closed because of a race condition in which an event was
registered in the background before the close
happened. Best practice is to keep an FD open and
remove it from the WaitContext
before closing it so that events associated with it can be reliably
eliminated.
Using raw sockets and pipes to communicate is very inconvenient for rich data types. To help make
this easier and less error prone, crosvm uses the serde
crate. To allow transmitting types with
embedded descriptors (FDs on Linux or HANDLEs on Windows), a module is provided for sending and
receiving descriptors alongside the plain old bytes that serde consumes.
Source code is organized into crates, each with their own unit tests.
./src/
- The top-level binary front-end for using crosvm.aarch64
- Support code specific to 64-bit ARM architectures.base
- Safe wrappers for system facilities which provides cross-platform-compatible interfaces.cros_async
- Runtime for async/await programming. This crate provides aFuture
executor based onio_uring
and one based onepoll
.devices
- Virtual devices exposed to the guest OS.disk
- Library to create and manipulate several types of disks such as raw disk, qcow, etc.hypervisor
- Abstract layer to interact with hypervisors. For Linux, this crate is a wrapper ofkvm
.e2e_tests
- End-to-end tests that run a crosvm VM.infra
- Infrastructure recipes for continuous integration testing.jail
- Sandboxing helper library for Linux.jail/seccomp
- Contains minijail seccomp policy files for each sandboxed device. Because some syscalls vary by architecture, the seccomp policies are split by architecture.kernel_loader
- Loads kernel images in various formats to a slice of memory.kvm_sys
- Low-level (mostly) auto-generated structures and constants for using KVM.kvm
- Unsafe, low-level wrapper code for usingkvm_sys
.media/libvda
- Safe wrapper of libvda, a ChromeOS HW-accelerated video decoding/encoding library.net_sys
- Low-level (mostly) auto-generated structures and constants for creating TUN/TAP devices.net_util
- Wrapper for creating TUN/TAP devices.qcow_util
- A library and a binary to manipulate qcow disks.sync
- Our version ofstd::sync::Mutex
andstd::sync::Condvar
.third_party
- Third-party libraries which we are maintaining on the ChromeOS tree or the AOSP tree.tools
- Scripts for code health such as wrappers ofrustfmt
andclippy
.vfio_sys
- Low-level (mostly) auto-generated structures, constants and ioctls for VFIO.vhost
- Wrappers for creating vhost based devices.virtio_sys
- Low-level (mostly) auto-generated structures and constants for interfacing with kernel vhost support.vm_control
- IPC for the VM.vm_memory
- VM-specific memory objects.x86_64
- Support code specific to 64-bit x86 machines.