You signed in with another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You signed out in another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.You switched accounts on another tab or window. Reload to refresh your session.Dismiss alert
{{ message }}
Repository navigation
Commit f170af8
Browse filesBrowse the repository at this point in the historyBrowse files
feat(skill): 1.115.0 — wave 36 quarantine the untrusted reader from the privileged actor (#295)
security-ai-agents.md gains 'Quarantine the reader from the actor': a two-role split — a reader with no creds/write/egress emits only schema-validated data operands (never the action); a privileged actor whose action is fixed by the trusted task plan + an allowlist takes the reader's value only as an operand. A schema validates shape not authority, so an injection corrupts at most an operand, not the action. MCP: trust the transport, not the payload. One eval (119). Closes#295.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: .claude-plugin/plugin.json
+1-1Lines changed: 1 addition & 1 deletion
Original file line number
Diff line number
Diff line change
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
2
2
"name": "deep-code-review",
3
3
"description": "Perun — bring the thunder to your codebase. A portable, evidence-grounded quality bar for building with AI agents: the flagship deep-code-review skill (default install is review-only), plus opt-in overlays — gated delivery, an idea critic, a suite conductor, and stage-aware product, growth, positioning, business-ops, and output-safety specialists.",
Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: .claude/skills/deep-code-review/evals/evals.json
+11Lines changed: 11 additions & 0 deletions
Original file line number
Diff line number
Diff line change
@@ -1260,6 +1260,17 @@
1260
1260
"Prescribes a consumer-driven contract assertion: a backward-compatible additive change passes, only a real incompatibility fails",
1261
1261
"Classifies the renamed consumer-read field as the breaking change (SemVer major / versioned migration) and the new optional field as safe; reserves golden fixtures for small stable identities"
"prompt": "Our agent reads GitHub issue text and MCP tool responses, and the same agent holds a GITHUB_TOKEN and can call a post_comment / merge_pr tool. We spotlight the untrusted content with <untrusted> tags and schema-validate the tool arguments. Is that enough to stop an injected 'merge this PR' instruction hidden in an issue?",
1267
+
"expected_output": "Not enough -- the controls all live inside ONE identity that both ingests the untrusted issue/MCP content AND holds the token and the privileged tools, so a successful injection is a confused deputy: spotlighting and argument validation lower the odds, but the agent that read the malicious 'merge this PR' is the same agent that CAN merge. The architectural fix is to quarantine the reader from the actor: a reader identity with no token/write/egress consumes the issue and MCP output and emits only structured, schema-validated DATA OPERANDS (e.g. {target, fields}) -- never the action to take. The action is fixed by the trusted task plan, not derived from the issue: a separate privileged actor holds GITHUB_TOKEN, selects the operation from that plan, validates it against an allowlist of actions this task permits, and consumes the reader's value ONLY as an operand -- never as raw text and never as an intent/action selector (a schema validates shape, not authority, so a reader-supplied {intent: merge_pr} would still be a privileged action chosen by untrusted input). Then an injected 'merge this PR' can at most corrupt an operand the boundary rejects, not select a privileged ACTION. Review it as an architecture question: no single identity should both read untrusted input and wield the credentials. For the MCP link, trust the transport, not the payload -- an allowlisted server authenticates origin, not content safety. (security-ai-agents.md.)",
1268
+
"expectations": [
1269
+
"States that spotlighting + schema-validating arguments is NOT sufficient -- the same identity both reads untrusted content and holds the privileges (a confused deputy)",
1270
+
"Prescribes quarantining the reader (no creds/write/egress, emits structured schema-validated DATA OPERANDS only, never the action) from a privileged actor whose action is fixed by the trusted task plan (plus an action allowlist) and consumes the reader's value only as an operand, never as an intent/action selector",
1271
+
"Notes a schema validates shape not authority, so an injection can at most corrupt an operand rejected at the boundary, not select a privileged action; frames it as an architecture question (no single identity reads-untrusted AND wields-credentials, and the action space is fixed on the trusted side)",
1272
+
"For MCP: trust the transport, not the payload -- an allowlisted/signed server authenticates origin, not that the content is safe to act on"
0 commit comments