ta: qcom_pas: authenticate images and bind them to peripheral and device

Wire the certificate chain, signature, and metadata-binding checks
into the TA's INIT_IMAGE/AUTH_AND_RESET flow, so a firmware image's
hash table is only trusted once its signer and binding to this
peripheral and device are authenticated.

authenticate_metadata() now, after parsing the hash segment: rejects a
UIE-encrypted image (image decryption is not supported), verifies the
metadata version, resolves the per-segment digest size (MBN v5 is
always SHA-256; v6 selects SHA-256/SHA-384 from the metadata's
root_cert_sel via the fuse PTA), validates the OEM (and, for
double-signed images, QTI) certificate chain and signature against the
device root of trust, authenticates hash-table entry 0 (the ELF header
and program-header table), binds the metadata to this peripheral's
SW_ID and to device-identity fields (OEM/MODEL/JTAG/serial/SoC version)
via the fuse PTA, and enforces the PIL subsystem anti-rollback version
floor. Serial-number binding engages when the metadata or the
USE_SERIAL_NUM fuse requires it, or when the DEBUG, ROOT_REVOKE_ACTIVATE
or UIE_KEY_SWITCH metadata option requests its serial-gated enable
value; when engaged, a device with no fused serial fails the check
rather than passing it. When multiple root certificates are
provisioned, the image's root_cert_sel selects the anchoring root,
gated by the device activation/revocation lists, and the root-of-trust
digest covers all provisioned roots. The metadata-field bindings are
validated before the image signature, and the signature digest is
derived from the leaf certificate (RSA-PSS with SHA-256, ECDSA with
SHA-384) while the root-of-trust binding stays SHA-384. Each binding
check is enforced when secure boot is fused on and logged-and-tolerated
otherwise, so unsigned-boot boards still come up.

Enable CFG_QCOM_PAS_SECURE_BOOT by default on hoya-family platforms.

Signed-off-by: Selvam Sathappan Periakaruppan <speriaka@qti.qualcomm.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4.8

Author: zelvam95

core/arch/arm/plat-qcom/hoya/qcom-arch.mk

@@ -18,3 +18,7 @@ CFG_NUM_THREADS ?= 8
 # OP-TEE re-verifies each loaded PIL firmware segment against the image's
 # hash table before releasing the peripheral from reset.
 CFG_QCOM_PAS_HASH_VERIFY ?= y
+
+# Authenticate each image's certificate chain and signature, and bind it to
+# its peripheral and device, before trusting its hash table.
+CFG_QCOM_PAS_SECURE_BOOT ?= y