The submission does not describe a concrete bug, does not include a valid reproducer, and appears to be generated by AI.
- No reproducer is provided.
- The provided reproducer does not actually trigger the reported bug.
- The reported issue relates to slashing, which is not yet implemented.
- The issue exists in code that does not run in production (e.g., test code).
We do not consider the described behavior to be a bug, and the submission does not provide sufficient justification to classify it as such. If you believe you submitted genuine issue, it would strengthen the case to demonstrate that it could cause trivially erroneous behavior: node crashes, consensus stalls requiring manual intervention, the creation of a finalized fork, etc.
For resource exhaustion issues, this includes failing to demonstrate superlinear growth.
Note that:
- The simultaneous creation of notarization and skip votes or certificates for a slot is an expected mechanism that ensures Simplex liveness.
- Temporary block rate degradation during and shortly after a malicious leader window is expected. After all, a Byzantine leader can just choose not to produce a block and make all nodes wait for the skip timeout.
- The reproducer requires access to a node state that would not exist in production. For example, an attacker cannot arbitrarily corrupt a node's local database unless an exploit enabling such corruption exists—in which case the report should focus on that exploit.
- The reproducer depends on modifying blockchain parameters that require agreement from a quorum of validators. This includes all config parameters.
The reported issue may be a bug, but it is not exploitable.
We are already aware of the issue.
We agree that this appears to be a legitimate bug.