This run closes the one gap docs/MCP.md still named: no client outside this
repository had ever connected to the MCP server. The client here is the MCP
Inspector's CLI, @modelcontextprotocol/inspector pinned at 2.2.0, run with
npx --yes. It is a separate codebase with its own client implementation; the
only thing it was given from this repository is the config file below and, for
the HTTP leg, a URL.
inspector-config.json in this directory is the mcpServers block
docs/MCP.md documents, with cwd filled in for this machine:
{
"mcpServers": {
"lacuna": {
"command": "npm",
"args": ["run", "mcp", "--", "--stdio"],
"cwd": "D:\\project\\lacuna"
}
}
}The inspector consumed that file with --config ... --server lacuna, spawned
the server through npm run mcp -- --stdio exactly as written, and every call
below went through it. The config block in docs/MCP.md is no longer written
only from the transport's requirements; this is a session that used it.
Every command exited 0. Files are the unedited stdout of each call; each
.stderr file holds the server's one-line startup banner (stdio) or nothing
(HTTP).
| File | Call | Result |
|---|---|---|
inspector-stdio-tools-list.txt |
tools/list over stdio |
all four tools with input and output schemas |
inspector-stdio-ask-answered.txt |
lacuna_ask Bellwether / beta_partner |
answered, Halverd, claim 797564529472318 |
inspector-stdio-ask-abstained.txt |
lacuna_ask Meridian / migration_window |
abstained, never_stated |
inspector-stdio-ask-via.txt |
lacuna_ask replay-queue / contact via vendor |
answered, Farah Haddad |
inspector-stdio-health.txt |
lacuna_health |
reachable: true, read epoch 6459 |
inspector-http-tools-list.txt |
tools/list over Streamable HTTP |
byte-identical to the stdio capture |
inspector-http-ask-answered.txt |
lacuna_ask Bellwether / beta_partner over HTTP |
same status, answer and claim id as stdio |
The HTTP leg ran against npm run mcp -- --http --port 3015, started
separately and stopped after the captures; the inspector was pointed at
http://127.0.0.1:3015/mcp with --transport http.
Two details worth naming:
- The two
tools/listcaptures, one per transport, hash identical (SHA-25679c690fa...). The tool surface is one definition served two ways, and now a third-party client has read it both ways. - The inspector announces protocol version
2025-11-25; this server's is2025-06-18. Every call succeeded, which is the SDK's version negotiation working against a client newer than the server.
The answered values match the fourth run's parity sweep in
../2026-08-14d/: same answer, same claim id, same
reason code on the abstention. The multi-hop call passed via as a plain
--tool-arg, so the optional argument works from a client that knows nothing
about this repository's types.
It proves a client not written here can consume the documented config, spawn
the server, list the tools and call them over both transports. It does not
put an editor or agent runtime on the other end; no interactive host has held
a session with this server, and docs/MCP.md still says so.
The HydraDB node was up on loopback for the whole run, checked on the admin
port before and after by status code, since /readyz answers 200 with an
empty body:
curl.exe -s -m 5 -w "HTTP %{http_code}\n" http://127.0.0.1:19091/readyz
HTTP 200
sourceState is live on every result. The tree is the one committed as
1e55414aa44d47c7dbe62391a8316cc0997d9839, unchanged by this run except for
this directory.
No file in this directory contains a credential. The captures carry entity
names, node ids, query text and bound parameters. A search for Bearer,
HYDRA_TOKEN and authorization across the directory returns nothing.