[BUG] Fixed OOB read in ACK payload parsing#3325
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CUDT::processCtrlAck
reads twoint32_t` fields out of the control packetpayload without validating its length:
ackdata[ACKD_RCVLASTACK](index 0) is dereferenced up front, OOB for0–3 byte payloads.
ackdata[ACKD_BUFFERLEFT](index 3) is dereferenced on the non-lite path,OOB for 5–15 byte payloads.
A peer can send an ACK control packet with an arbitrary intermediate
payload length and cause the receiver to read up to 15 bytes past the
allocated packet buffer. The value at index 3 is then assigned into
m_iFlowWindowSize, so the leaked memory directly perturbs send-sideflow control.