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RC-scoped 3.6.4 fixes for PHP 8, dblayertrap, and filter loading #28

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Merged
mambax7 merged 7 commits into from
Apr 21, 2026
Merged

RC-scoped 3.6.4 fixes for PHP 8, dblayertrap, and filter loading #28

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0e9c91d
fix(protector): RC-scoped stability and compatibility tightening for …
mambax7 Apr 20, 2026
98f081d
fix(protector): clarify 1.1 comment wording and tighten RC test helpers
mambax7 Apr 20, 2026
9443f97
test(protector): harden RC regression tests for determinism and fixt…
mambax7 Apr 20, 2026
25fe8fd
docs(protector): clarify Fix 1.2 rationale wording and Fix 1.5 test …
mambax7 Apr 20, 2026
28b3052
test(protector): clear superglobals before Protector::getInstance() …
mambax7 Apr 20, 2026
89140bf
fix(protector): skip directories and unreadable files in filter loader
mambax7 Apr 20, 2026
00f372c
test(protector): match both quote styles in allowlist regression check
mambax7 Apr 20, 2026
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58 changes: 47 additions & 11 deletions htdocs/xoops_lib/modules/protector/class/ProtectorFilter.php
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -91,18 +91,54 @@ public function execute($type)
$ret = 0;

$dh = opendir($this->filters_base);
if (false === $dh) {
return $ret;
}

// Fix 9.1: resolve the filters_enabled base path once so every candidate
// filter can be verified to live inside it. The previous loader included
// every file readdir() returned, which allowed a writable filters_enabled
// directory to achieve RCE if an attacker could place or symlink a file
// whose name happened to start with the requested type prefix.
// If realpath() fails (missing dir, broken symlink), bail out now — every
// per-file containment check below would fail the same way.
$baseReal = realpath($this->filters_base);
if (false === $baseReal) {
closedir($dh);
return $ret;
}

while (($file = readdir($dh)) !== false) {
if (strncmp($file, $type . '_', strlen($type) + 1) === 0) {
include_once $this->filters_base . '/' . $file;
$plugin_name = 'protector_' . substr($file, 0, -4);
if (function_exists($plugin_name)) {
// old way
$ret |= call_user_func($plugin_name);
} elseif (class_exists($plugin_name)) {
// newer way
$plugin_obj = new $plugin_name(); //old code is -> $plugin_obj =& new $plugin_name() ; //hack by Trabis
$ret |= $plugin_obj->execute();
}
if (strncmp($file, $type . '_', strlen($type) + 1) !== 0) {
continue;
}
// Require .php suffix — blocks .phtml, .inc, .phar and other executable
// extensions that may be interpreted as PHP by misconfigured servers.
// Case-insensitive: Windows NTFS and macOS HFS+ resolve case-variant
// filenames as the same file, and pre-existing custom filters may use
// .PHP / .Php. strcasecmp lets those continue to load on case-sensitive
// filesystems too.
if (0 !== strcasecmp(substr($file, -4), '.php')) {
continue;
}
// Resolve the real path and ensure it stays inside filters_enabled.
// Blocks symlinks pointing outside the directory and any crafted name
// whose canonical path escapes the base.
$realPath = realpath($this->filters_base . '/' . $file);
if (false === $realPath
|| !str_starts_with($realPath, $baseReal . DIRECTORY_SEPARATOR)) {
continue;
}
Comment thread
coderabbitai[bot] marked this conversation as resolved.
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Copilot AI Apr 20, 2026

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realpath() + prefix containment prevents traversal, but the loader still include_onces without first asserting the target is a regular readable file. If filters_enabled/ contains a directory (or unreadable file) matching the {$type}_*.php pattern, this will emit warnings during request handling (and may leak filesystem paths when display_errors is on). Consider adding an is_file() / is_readable() check on $realPath before including, similar to the pattern used for custom PHP blocks.

Suggested change
}
}
// Only include regular readable files. This avoids runtime warnings
// when a matching entry is a directory or otherwise unreadable.
if (!is_file($realPath) || !is_readable($realPath)) {
trigger_error('Unable to load Protector filter: ' . basename($realPath), E_USER_WARNING);
continue;
}

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include_once $realPath;
$plugin_name = 'protector_' . substr($file, 0, -4);
if (function_exists($plugin_name)) {
// old way
$ret |= call_user_func($plugin_name);
} elseif (class_exists($plugin_name)) {
// newer way
$plugin_obj = new $plugin_name(); //old code is -> $plugin_obj =& new $plugin_name() ; //hack by Trabis
$ret |= $plugin_obj->execute();
}
}
closedir($dh);
Expand Down
11 changes: 10 additions & 1 deletion htdocs/xoops_lib/modules/protector/class/ProtectorMysqlDatabase.class.php
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -45,7 +45,16 @@ public function injectionFound($sql)
$protector->last_error_type = 'SQL Injection';
$protector->message .= $sql;
$protector->output_log($protector->last_error_type);
die('SQL Injection found');

// Fix 1.4: reply with HTTP 403 and a generic body. The previous
// terminator returned HTTP 200 with a distinctive plain-text body,
// which fingerprinted the dblayertrap response and allowed attackers
// to probe the module's sensitivity character-by-character. A generic
// 'Forbidden' response matches any other blocked-request path.
if (!headers_sent()) {
http_response_code(403);
}
die('Forbidden');
}

/**
Expand Down
62 changes: 58 additions & 4 deletions htdocs/xoops_lib/modules/protector/class/protector.php
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -141,7 +141,12 @@ protected function _initial_recursive($val, $key)
}

// register as doubtful requests against SQL Injections
if (preg_match('?[\s\'"`/]?', $val)) {
// Fix 1.1: pin the PCRE delimiter to '#' for clarity. The legacy '?' form
// parsed correctly (PHP accepts '?' as a delimiter) but was visually
// ambiguous because '?' also serves as the zero-or-one quantifier. No
// detection-semantic change — the character class and match behaviour
// are identical to the previous form.
if (preg_match('#[\s\'"`/]#', $val)) {
$this->_doubtful_requests[(string)$key] = $val;
}
}
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -242,7 +247,11 @@ public function purgeSession()
public function purgeCookies()
{
if (!headers_sent()) {
$domain = defined(XOOPS_COOKIE_DOMAIN) ? XOOPS_COOKIE_DOMAIN : '';
// Fix 1.2: defined() requires the constant name as a string literal.
// Without quotes PHP 8 throws a Fatal Error when XOOPS_COOKIE_DOMAIN is absent;
// when it is defined, PHP evaluates it first and passes its value to defined(),
// which is then always false.
Comment thread
mambax7 marked this conversation as resolved.
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$domain = defined('XOOPS_COOKIE_DOMAIN') ? XOOPS_COOKIE_DOMAIN : '';
$past = time() - 3600;
foreach ($_COOKIE as $key => $value) {
setcookie($key, '', $past, '', $domain);
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -681,7 +690,44 @@ public function dblayertrap_init($force_override = false)
$this->_dblayertrap_check_recursive($_POST);
$this->_dblayertrap_check_recursive($_COOKIE);
if (empty($this->_conf['dblayertrap_wo_server'])) {
$this->_dblayertrap_check_recursive($_SERVER);
// Fix 1.5: scan only a positive allowlist of server-intrinsic $_SERVER keys.
// Any denylist over this surface is incomplete. Request-derived keys are
// excluded — attacker-controlled values in them would otherwise poison
// _dblayertrap_doubtfuls and trigger false-positive cascades on queries
// that happen to share a substring with the attacker's input.
//
// Excluded classes:
// - HTTP_* (all request headers expand to this namespace)
// - CONTENT_TYPE, CONTENT_LENGTH (request headers outside HTTP_*)
// - PHP_AUTH_USER, PHP_AUTH_PW, PHP_AUTH_DIGEST, AUTH_TYPE (auth headers)
// - QUERY_STRING, REQUEST_URI, PATH_INFO, PATH_TRANSLATED, ORIG_PATH_INFO (URL parts)
// - REDIRECT_* (mod_rewrite/redirect context)
// - PHP_SELF, SCRIPT_NAME (request-derived on URL-rewriting deployments;
// Protector itself has documented XSS handling for these elsewhere)
// - SERVER_NAME (reflects the Host header when UseCanonicalName is Off,
// which is common on Apache and default on many reverse-proxied setups)
// - REQUEST_METHOD (client-supplied token from the request line; Apache
// and many other servers pass arbitrary method names like SELECT or
// UNION straight through to PHP)
// - SERVER_PROTOCOL (client-supplied token from the request line; a
// lenient server can surface values like SELECT/1.0, and its realistic
// contents HTTP/1.0 | HTTP/1.1 | HTTP/2.0 offer no SQLi signal anyway)
//
// The existing dblayertrap_wo_server config flag remains as the escape hatch
// for admins who want to skip the $_SERVER scan entirely.
static $serverScanAllowlist = [
'SERVER_ADDR' => true,
'SERVER_PORT' => true,
'SERVER_SOFTWARE' => true,
'GATEWAY_INTERFACE' => true,
'DOCUMENT_ROOT' => true,
'REQUEST_SCHEME' => true,
'REMOTE_ADDR' => true,
'REMOTE_PORT' => true,
'SCRIPT_FILENAME' => true,
];
$serverSafe = array_intersect_key($_SERVER, $serverScanAllowlist);
$this->_dblayertrap_check_recursive($serverSafe);
}

if (!empty($this->_dblayertrap_doubtfuls) || $force_override) {
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1284,7 +1330,15 @@ public function check_dos_attack($uid = 0, $can_ban = false)
}

// Check its Agent
if ('' != trim($this->_conf['dos_crsafe']) && isset($_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']) && preg_match($this->_conf['dos_crsafe'], $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'])) {
// Fix 1.3 (runtime guard): an admin-supplied regex that is syntactically invalid
// would emit a PHP warning on every request. Probe validity against an empty
// subject first; silently ignore the setting if invalid.
// NOTE: this check covers SYNTAX only. A syntactically-valid but catastrophically
// backtracking pattern (ReDoS) still runs against the real User-Agent. Full
// admin-side validation and PCRE backtrack-limit handling defer to 3.7.0.
$crsafe_pattern = trim((string)($this->_conf['dos_crsafe'] ?? ''));
$crsafe_valid = '' !== $crsafe_pattern && false !== @preg_match($crsafe_pattern, '');
if ($crsafe_valid && isset($_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT']) && preg_match($crsafe_pattern, $_SERVER['HTTP_USER_AGENT'])) {
// welcomed crawler
$this->_done_dos = true;

Expand Down
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