GeoLens 1.2.4 fixes a set of vulnerabilities, the most serious of which allow authenticated or anonymous users to obtain data and metadata for datasets they are not authorized to access.
Impact
- Private record metadata disclosure. Record contact, keyword, and distribution sub-resource endpoints did not re-authorize the backing dataset, so any authenticated user could read a private record's contact details (PII), keywords, and distributions. (Runtime-proven.)
- Private tile data via shared caches. Private raster and vector tiles were served with shared-cache (
Cache-Control: public) headers, so a shared cache (a CDN or the bundled reverse proxy) could retain private tile bytes and replay them to later unauthenticated requests, including unpublished public-dataset previews.
- Private dataset title enumeration. The map visibility-check endpoint did not authorize read access to the map, allowing any editor to enumerate the titles of non-public datasets in any map by ID — including private maps owned by other users.
- SSRF via DNS rebinding. URL validation for user-supplied service URLs (probes, STAC/OGC API sources, manifest downloads) resolved DNS once and then let the HTTP client re-resolve at connect time, allowing a low-TTL domain to pass validation as a public address and connect to an internal/metadata address.
- Token leak + header injection in service preview. The remote-service preview path passed the authorization token to GDAL via the process environment without sanitization, leaking it through
/proc/<pid>/environ and allowing CRLF header injection.
- Unauthenticated STAC search DoS.
POST /search did not cap the size of GeoJSON intersects geometries (the GET sibling did).
- API key written to access logs. The bundled reverse proxy logged the
api_key query-string credential in cleartext.
- Security posture coupled to a logging flag. API documentation exposure and the Secure flag on the OAuth session cookie were keyed off the
LOG_JSON logging flag rather than an explicit environment setting, so a production deployment at the default could expose /docs and emit a non-Secure session cookie.
- Missing Content-Security-Policy (defense-in-depth). The web application shipped no
script-src/default-src CSP, leaving no containment for token exfiltration if an XSS issue were introduced.
- Weak default install credentials. The installer kept the published default database password and could silently retain the default admin password on a headless install.
Patches
Upgrade to GeoLens 1.2.4. No configuration changes are required for the authorization and cache fixes. Operators on a public, TLS-terminated deployment should additionally set ENVIRONMENT=production to make the production security posture explicit; deployments that do not set it retain their prior behavior.
Workarounds
None for the authorization/cache disclosure flaws — upgrading is required. The SSRF and STAC-DoS surfaces can be partially mitigated at the network/proxy layer (egress filtering to block link-local metadata addresses; a request-size limit on POST /search), but the code fix is the durable remedy.
References
References
GeoLens 1.2.4 fixes a set of vulnerabilities, the most serious of which allow authenticated or anonymous users to obtain data and metadata for datasets they are not authorized to access.
Impact
Cache-Control: public) headers, so a shared cache (a CDN or the bundled reverse proxy) could retain private tile bytes and replay them to later unauthenticated requests, including unpublished public-dataset previews./proc/<pid>/environand allowing CRLF header injection.POST /searchdid not cap the size of GeoJSONintersectsgeometries (theGETsibling did).api_keyquery-string credential in cleartext.LOG_JSONlogging flag rather than an explicit environment setting, so a production deployment at the default could expose/docsand emit a non-Secure session cookie.script-src/default-srcCSP, leaving no containment for token exfiltration if an XSS issue were introduced.Patches
Upgrade to GeoLens 1.2.4. No configuration changes are required for the authorization and cache fixes. Operators on a public, TLS-terminated deployment should additionally set
ENVIRONMENT=productionto make the production security posture explicit; deployments that do not set it retain their prior behavior.Workarounds
None for the authorization/cache disclosure flaws — upgrading is required. The SSRF and STAC-DoS surfaces can be partially mitigated at the network/proxy layer (egress filtering to block link-local metadata addresses; a request-size limit on
POST /search), but the code fix is the durable remedy.References
References