BSIP83: Decouple BitAssets from Platform Governance Process

bsip-0083.md

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+```
+BSIP: 0083
+Title: Decouple BitAssets from Platform Governance Process
+Authors:    
+   Alfredo Garcia
+   Christopher Sanborn
+   John M. Jones
+   Michel Santos
+   Nathan Hourt
+   Peter Conrad
+   Ryan R. Fox
+Status: Draft
+Type: Protocol
+Obsoletes: BSIP-0016, BSIP-0058, BSIP-0059, BSIP-0075, BSIP-0076
+Created: 2019-10-07
+Discussion: https://github.com/bitshares/bsips/issues/239
+Worker: <TBD>
+```
+
+# Abstract
+This BSIP separates the governance of the technical security of the blockchain from the governance of BitAssets.  BitAssets are a collection of special case SmartCoin which conflate blockchain governance and market effectiveness. To best serve the BitShares protocol, the existing set of BitAssets must be reconfigured to separate the concerns of block production, price feeds, and market operations; that is to say: deterministic consensus, non-deterministic external data, and smart contract settings.
+
+Therefore, this BSIP defines a process for BitAssets management to ensure protocol security remains the singular focus of the block producer role, and give BitAssets the best chance for long-term viability by nominating a new custodian to quickly react to market conditions.  Furthermore, the portion of BTS collateral below the full valuation of a debt asset, as defined by its price feed, that is borrowed from the blockchain, shall not contribute to the voting power of the debtor.
+
+# Motivation
+Block production is an essential component of the BitShares platform itself, and as such should be expected to take an agnostic and neutral view towards the products deployed within the platform. Therefore, this BSIP will define a process for BitAsset management to ensure protocol security remains the singular focus of the block producer role and give BitAssets the best chance for long-term stability by nominating a new custodian to quickly react to market conditions. In order for the distributed consensus mechanism of DPOS to achieve adequate decentralization, it is imperative that block producers maintain strict independence from the politics of individual products deployed on the platform. 
+
+Governance is an important component of the core BTS token and effective application of governance throughout the BitShares protocol is imperative to the long-term success of the project.  A number of BSIPs have addressed the shortcomings of the existing vote calculation mechanism. This BSIP changes vote calculation which currently confers governance rights which are intended for assignment to the protocol.
+
+In short, this BSIP will put the BitAssets under the control of a designated user account. With this change, the newly appointed BitAssets manager will be able to independently maintain the parameters of their derivative asset without interference from the platform’s block producers and committee members. At the same time, the platform itself and its committee will not be unduly influenced by the demands of private product management. An advantage gained by this is that the BitAsset manager will be able to react appropriately to rapidly changing market conditions, as may be required to properly maintain a successful derivative asset.
+
+# Rationale
+Because the BitAssets are currently controlled by platform-wide governance mechanisms, and because these are not well suited to the management of smart coins, which may at times need to respond quickly to market conditions, the authors propose to reorganize these assets to utilize a directly appointed multisignature authority and thereby enable these assets to update in synchronization with market ebbs and flows.
+
+The authors recommend reassigning the blockchain-controlled BitAssets’ issuer field from committee-account to cn-vote, which is a multisignature account composed of seven different parties and having numerous proxy followers, and setting cn-vote as the sole feed producer, until cn-vote can delegate this role to accounts of its own appointment. The authors selected cn-vote for this role because cn-vote has demonstrated an active and vested interest in the stability and viability of the BitAsset products. Should cn-vote accept this appointment, the specification of the BitAsset parameters and feed production will become the responsibility of the cn-vote multisignature account.
+
+As a result of this assignment, the block producers will no longer provide feeds for BitAssets, and the new set of feed producers will no longer be affected by direct stakeholder voting.
+
+Because BitAsset management will no longer be affected by stakeholder voting, the vote-weighting calculations can be amended without detriment so that accounts holding BTS collateral positions will count only collateral above the value of their debt at the feed price. Collateral up to a 1.0 collateral-to-debt ratio is under lien to the BitAsset holder, and therefore does not represent a stake in the blockchain, and will no longer be counted as voting stake. Collateral in excess of a 1.0 collateral-to-debt ratio will continue to be counted in the debt holder’s voting stake.
+
+# Specification
+The blockchain software is designed to support assets with multisignature issuer authorities; therefore, the technical changes required for this proposal are straightforward. The following technical changes are required:
+
+**Assignment of Accumulated Fees**
+
+At the hardfork date, the accumulated fees of the existing BitAssets will be transferred to the committee-account.
+
+**Update to Committee-Controlled BitAsset Issuer Fields**
+
+At the hardfork date, the committee-controlled BitAsset objects' issuer fields will be updated to specify the cn-vote account (ID 1.2.1148184). The existing price feeds will be cleared, and the cn-vote account will be specified as the feed producer. After the hardfork, the cn-vote account will be able to assign other feed producers at its discretion.
+
+**Disable the witness_fed_asset and committee_fed_asset Flags**
+
+At the hardfork date, the `witness_fed_asset` and `committee_fed_asset` flags will be unset from the BitAssets, and will be disabled from use in future assets.
+
+**Amend total_core_in_orders to Track Limit and Collateral Orders Separately**
+
+The `total_core_in_orders` field of the `account_statistics_object` will be deprecated, and assets in limit orders will be tallied in a new `total_core_in_limit_orders` field while collateral will be tracked in a new `total_core_in_collateral_orders` map, keyed on the collateralized asset ID. During vote weight calculation, the `total_core_in_limit_orders` will add directly to the account’s voting weight; additionally, the `total_core_in_collateral_orders` which exceeds the feed price value of the collateralized debt will be added to the account’s voting weight as well.
+
+**Enable Remittance of Worker Proposals in Core Asset**
+
+Escrow agents administering existing worker proposals presently denominated in BitAssets shall be authorized to remit worker payments in BitShares core asset, or in a BitAsset selected at the discretion of the workers and escrow agents.
+
+# Discussion
+### Voting Power
+The voting power of debt holders will be reduced to only the portion of collateral that exceeds full collateral valuation of the debt assets that are borrowed from the blockchain. It is arguable who “owns” BTS that are locked up as collateral in BitAsset smart contracts. The authors of this BSIP hold the view that debt holders have received BitAssets in return for their collateral (which they may have sold on the market for more BTS), and thus have given up rights to the collateral itself, at least to the portion of collateral that represents the value of the BitAssets they have received. It is only logical that by exchanging the collateral for BitAssets they have given up the rights associated with the collateral, including its voting power.
+### Worker Proposals
+Worker proposals were originally denominated in BitAssets with the intent to add liquidity in their respective markets. With BitAssets now being placed under user control, liquidity is no longer the concern of the platform. A further implication of placing BitAssets under custodian control is that workers being paid in BitAssets would be exposed to the risk of devaluation and/or de-pegging at the custodian's discretion. This BSIP aims to remedy this by allowing different payout methods deemed less risky.
+
+# Summary
+In this BSIP the authors provide a unified solution to advance the project forward most efficiently. This proposal will decouple BitAssets from the rest of the BitShares platform with regard to governance. Instead, BitAssets can be controlled independently by a new BitAsset manager. The platform will be governed by the elected witnesses and committee, as before. This BSIP does not impact non-BitAsset Smart Coins.
+
+# Copyright
+This document is placed into the public domain.