Hello CIRCL maintainers,
I am looking for narrowly scoped technical feedback on the use of CIRCL as an independent ML-DSA verifier in an open reproducibility project.
I maintain an open verification project called QSP.
Current public Stage391 repository:
https://github.com/mokkunsuzuki-code/stage391
Public verification page:
https://mokkunsuzuki-code.github.io/stage391/
This is not a vulnerability report, certification request, endorsement request, or request for a review of the whole QSP project.
The specific reason I am contacting CIRCL is that QSP Stage387 introduced a second ML-DSA verification implementation using CIRCL in order to reduce dependence on a single verifier implementation.
The relevant design goal was:
same public key
+
same signed target
+
same signature
+
independent ML-DSA implementation
cross-implementation verification evidence
Stage387 then carries forward into the independent reproduction and assessment path now exposed by Stage391.
Current Stage391 assessment commit:
a74b7f47f8caabf37a910ea9f4da2b87c0cd5f15
Canonical Stage391 result SHA-256:
ed644d11bd49f67f89cfda50364d619066b4da3a36bf1fb26b38e111b6092b23
Current authoritative state:
third_party_submission_pending
verification_status:
waiting_for_external_submission
No independent external assessment is currently claimed.
My question is intentionally narrow:
Is the way QSP uses CIRCL as an independent ML-DSA verification implementation technically meaningful as cross-implementation evidence?
I would especially value feedback on any of the following:
- whether the CIRCL verification path is being used correctly,
- whether the compared ML-DSA inputs are sufficient for meaningful interoperability evidence,
- whether important FIPS 204 / ML-DSA parameters or encodings are missing from the comparison,
- whether the test demonstrates verifier independence in a meaningful way,
- identification of any concrete methodological flaw,
- or an independent reproduction of the CIRCL-based verification path.
A full review of QSP is not required.
Negative feedback is fully acceptable. A mismatch, incorrect assumption, or methodological criticism would be as valuable as agreement.
The relevant QSP work includes:
- Stage386: public-key binding and evidence portability
- Stage387: ML-DSA multi-implementation interoperability
- Stage390: independent assessment intake
- Stage391: external reproduction adjudication
A self-contained third-party reproduction package is prepared, but I am not attaching it unsolicited.
If a maintainer would like to inspect or reproduce the exact evidence, I can provide the fixed archive and SHA-256 record.
Related external requests:
mldsa-native:
pq-code-package/mldsa-native#1393
PQCA Readiness Tracking WG:
PQCA/wg-readiness-tracking#41
Open Quantum Safe:
https://github.com/orgs/open-quantum-safe/discussions/2533
OpenSSF Supply Chain Integrity:
ossf/wg-supply-chain-integrity#88
Thank you for any technical criticism or direction.
Best regards,
Motohiro Suzuki
Hello CIRCL maintainers,
I am looking for narrowly scoped technical feedback on the use of CIRCL as an independent ML-DSA verifier in an open reproducibility project.
I maintain an open verification project called QSP.
Current public Stage391 repository:
https://github.com/mokkunsuzuki-code/stage391
Public verification page:
https://mokkunsuzuki-code.github.io/stage391/
This is not a vulnerability report, certification request, endorsement request, or request for a review of the whole QSP project.
The specific reason I am contacting CIRCL is that QSP Stage387 introduced a second ML-DSA verification implementation using CIRCL in order to reduce dependence on a single verifier implementation.
The relevant design goal was:
same public key
+
same signed target
+
same signature
+
independent ML-DSA implementation
cross-implementation verification evidence
Stage387 then carries forward into the independent reproduction and assessment path now exposed by Stage391.
Current Stage391 assessment commit:
a74b7f47f8caabf37a910ea9f4da2b87c0cd5f15
Canonical Stage391 result SHA-256:
ed644d11bd49f67f89cfda50364d619066b4da3a36bf1fb26b38e111b6092b23
Current authoritative state:
third_party_submission_pending
verification_status:
waiting_for_external_submission
No independent external assessment is currently claimed.
My question is intentionally narrow:
Is the way QSP uses CIRCL as an independent ML-DSA verification implementation technically meaningful as cross-implementation evidence?
I would especially value feedback on any of the following:
A full review of QSP is not required.
Negative feedback is fully acceptable. A mismatch, incorrect assumption, or methodological criticism would be as valuable as agreement.
The relevant QSP work includes:
A self-contained third-party reproduction package is prepared, but I am not attaching it unsolicited.
If a maintainer would like to inspect or reproduce the exact evidence, I can provide the fixed archive and SHA-256 record.
Related external requests:
mldsa-native:
pq-code-package/mldsa-native#1393
PQCA Readiness Tracking WG:
PQCA/wg-readiness-tracking#41
Open Quantum Safe:
https://github.com/orgs/open-quantum-safe/discussions/2533
OpenSSF Supply Chain Integrity:
ossf/wg-supply-chain-integrity#88
Thank you for any technical criticism or direction.
Best regards,
Motohiro Suzuki