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First pass fwctl for Broadcom NICs #4

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@gospo gospo commented Sep 16, 2024

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davejiang and others added 20 commits August 20, 2024 12:05
@davejiang @jgunthorpe
cxl: Move mailbox related bits to the same context
b92a097 
Create a new 'struct cxl_mailbox' and move all mailbox related bits to
it. This allows isolation of all CXL mailbox data in order to export
some of the calls to external caller (fwctl) and avoid exporting of
CXL driver specific bits such has device states.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@davejiang @jgunthorpe
cxl: Fix comment regarding cxl_query_cmd() return data
4451118 
The code indicates that the min of n_commands and total commands
is returned. The comment incorrectly says it's the max(). Correct
comment to min().

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@davejiang @jgunthorpe
cxl: Refactor user ioctl command path from mds to mailbox
e5c38a2 
With 'struct cxl_mailbox' context introduced, the helper functions
cxl_query_cmd() and cxl_send_cmd() can take a cxl_mailbox directly
rather than a cxl_memdev parameter. Refactor to use cxl_mailbox
directly.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@davejiang @jgunthorpe
cxl: Add Get Supported Features command for kernel usage
69f846d 
CXL spec r3.1 8.2.9.6.1 Get Supported Features (Opcode 0500h)
The command retrieve the list of supported device-specific features
(identified by UUID) and general information about each Feature.

The driver will retrieve the feature entries in order to make checks and
provide information for the Get Feature and Set Feature command. One of
the main piece of information retrieved are the effects a Set Feature
command would have for a particular feature.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@davejiang @jgunthorpe
cxl/test: Add Get Supported Features mailbox command support
220f104 
Add cxl-test emulation of Get Supported Features mailbox command.
Currently only planning to add the Device Patrol Scrub Control feature
as a testing vehicle.

CXL spec r3.1 8.2.9.9.11.1 Device Patrol Scrub Control Feature.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@davejiang @jgunthorpe
cxl: Add Get Feature command support
6f97008 
Add enumeration of Get Feature mailbox command for the kernel to recognize
the command being passed in from user space.

CXL spec r3.1 8.2.9.6.2 Get Feature (Opcode 0501h)

The feature requested is identified by specific UUID.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@davejiang @jgunthorpe
cxl: Add Set Feature command support
b03e2e9 
Add enumeration of Set Feature mailbox command for the kernel to recognize
the command being passed in from user space.

CXL spec r3.1 8.2.9.6.3 Set Feature (Opcode 0502h)

The feature requested is identified by specific UUID.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@jgunthorpe
cxl: Infrastructure for fwctl
cd0c76b 
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@jgunthorpe
fwctl: Add basic structure for a class subsystem with a cdev
97a1e33 
Create the class, character device and functions for a fwctl driver to
un/register to the subsystem.

A typical fwctl driver has a sysfs presence like:

$ ls -l /dev/fwctl/fwctl0
crw------- 1 root root 250, 0 Apr 25 19:16 /dev/fwctl/fwctl0

$ ls /sys/class/fwctl/fwctl0
dev  device  power  subsystem  uevent

$ ls /sys/class/fwctl/fwctl0/device/infiniband/
ibp0s10f0

$ ls /sys/class/infiniband/ibp0s10f0/device/fwctl/
fwctl0/

$ ls /sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:0a.0/fwctl/fwctl0
dev  device  power  subsystem  uevent

Which allows userspace to link all the multi-subsystem driver components
together and learn the subsystem specific names for the device's
components.

Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@jgunthorpe
fwctl: Basic ioctl dispatch for the character device
d3c7613 
Each file descriptor gets a chunk of per-FD driver specific context that
allows the driver to attach a device specific struct to. The core code
takes care of the memory lifetime for this structure.

The ioctl dispatch and design is based on what was built for iommufd. The
ioctls have a struct which has a combined in/out behavior with a typical
'zero pad' scheme for future extension and backwards compatibility.

Like iommufd some shared logic does most of the ioctl marshalling and
compatibility work and tables diatches to some function pointers for
each unique iotcl.

This approach has proven to work quite well in the iommufd and rdma
subsystems.

Allocate an ioctl number space for the subsystem.

Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@jgunthorpe
fwctl: FWCTL_INFO to return basic information about the device
9947b9c 
Userspace will need to know some details about the fwctl interface being
used to locate the correct userspace code to communicate with the
kernel. Provide a simple device_type enum indicating what the kernel
driver is.

Allow the device to provide a device specific info struct that contains
any additional information that the driver may need to provide to
userspace.

Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@jgunthorpe
taint: Add TAINT_FWCTL
19bdadd 
Requesting a fwctl scope of access that includes mutating device debug
data will cause the kernel to be tainted. Changing the device operation
through things in the debug scope may cause the device to malfunction in
undefined ways. This should be reflected in the TAINT flags to help any
debuggers understand that something has been done.

Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@jgunthorpe
fwctl: FWCTL_RPC to execute a Remote Procedure Call to device firmware
4111dc1 
Add the FWCTL_RPC ioctl which allows a request/response RPC call to device
firmware. Drivers implementing this call must follow the security
guidelines under Documentation/userspace-api/fwctl.rst

The core code provides some memory management helpers to get the messages
copied from and back to userspace. The driver is responsible for
allocating the output message memory and delivering the message to the
device.

Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@jgunthorpe
fwctl: Add documentation
a5ec3ec 
Document the purpose and rules for the fwctl subsystem.

Link in kdocs to the doc tree.

Nacked-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Acked-by: Daniel Vetter <[email protected]>
https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@jgunthorpe
fwctl/mlx5: Support for communicating with mlx5 fw
880a0b7 
mlx5's fw has long provided a User Context concept. This has a long
history in RDMA as part of the devx extended verbs programming
interface. A User Context is a security envelope that contains objects and
controls access. It contains the Protection Domain object from the
InfiniBand Architecture and both togther provide the OS with the necessary
tools to bind a security context like a process to the device.

The security context is restricted to not be able to touch the kernel or
other processes. In the RDMA verbs case it is also restricted to not touch
global device resources.

The fwctl_mlx5 takes this approach and builds a User Context per fwctl
file descriptor and uses a FW security capability on the User Context to
enable access to global device resources. This makes the context useful
for provisioning and debugging the global device state.

mlx5 already has a robust infrastructure for delivering RPC messages to
fw. Trivially connect fwctl's RPC mechanism to mlx5_cmd_do(). Enforce the
User Context ID in every RPC header so the FW knows the security context
of the issuing ID.

Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@jgunthorpe
mlx5: Create an auxiliary device for fwctl_mlx5
e3f4f63 
If the device supports User Context then it can support fwctl. Create an
auxiliary device to allow fwctl to bind to it.

Create a sysfs like:

$ ls /sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:0a.0/mlx5_core.fwctl.0/driver -l
lrwxrwxrwx 1 root root 0 Apr 25 19:46 /sys/devices/pci0000:00/0000:00:0a.0/mlx5_core.fwctl.0/driver -> ../../../../bus/auxiliary/drivers/mlx5_fwctl.mlx5_fwctl

Signed-off-by: Saeed Mahameed <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@davejiang @jgunthorpe
fwctl/cxl: Add driver for CXL mailbox for handling CXL features comma…
0490d20 
…nds (RFC)

Add an fwctl (auxiliary bus) driver to allow sending of CXL feature
commands from userspace through as ioctls. Create a driver skeleton for
initial setup.

FWCTL_INFO will return the commands supported by the fwctl char device as
a bitmap of enable commands.

fwctl provides a fwctl_ops->fw_rpc() callback in order to issue ioctls to
a device.

FWCTL_RPC will start by supporting the CXL feature commands: Get Supported
Features, Get Feature, and Set Feature.

FWCTL_RPC provides 'enum fwctl_rpc_scope' parameter where it indicates the
security scope of the call. The Get Supported Features and Get Feature
calls can be executed with the scope of FWCTL_RPC_DEBUG_READ_ONLY. The Set
Feature call is gated by the effects of the feature reported by Get
Supported Features call for the specific feature.

Add a software command through FWCTL_RPC in order for the user to retrieve
information about the commands that are supported. In this instance only 3
commands are supported: Get Supported Features, Get Feature, and Set
Feature.

The expected flow of operation is to send the call first with 0 set to the
n_commands parameter to indicate query of total commands available. And
then a second call provides the number of commands to retrieve with the
appropriate amount of memory allocated to store information about the
commands.

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@jgunthorpe
cxl: Create an auxiliary device for fwctl_cxl
960f17f 
This will link the fwctl subsystem to CXL devices.

Signed-off-by: Dave Jiang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@jgunthorpe
cover-letter: Introduce fwctl subystem
3175f4c 
fwctl is a new subsystem intended to bring some common rules and order to
the growing pattern of exposing a secure FW interface directly to
userspace. Unlike existing places like RDMA/DRM/VFIO/uacce that are
exposing a device for datapath operations fwctl is focused on debugging,
configuration and provisioning of the device. It will not have the
necessary features like interrupt delivery to support a datapath.

This concept is similar to the long standing practice in the "HW" RAID
space of having a device specific misc device to manager the RAID
controller FW. fwctl generalizes this notion of a companion debug and
management interface that goes along with a dataplane implemented in an
appropriate subsystem.

The need for this has reached a critical point as many users are moving to
run lockdown enabled kernels. Several existing devices have had long
standing tooling for management that relied on /sys/../resource0 or PCI
config space access which is not permitted in lockdown. A major point of
fwctl is to define and document the rules that a device must follow to
expose a lockdown compatible RPC.

Based on some discussion fwctl splits the RPCs into four categories

	FWCTL_RPC_CONFIGURATION
	FWCTL_RPC_DEBUG_READ_ONLY
	FWCTL_RPC_DEBUG_WRITE
	FWCTL_RPC_DEBUG_WRITE_FULL

Where the latter two trigger a new TAINT_FWCTL, and the final one requires
CAP_SYS_RAWIO - excluding it from lockdown. The device driver and its FW
would be responsible to restrict RPCs to the requested security scope,
while the core code handles the tainting and CAP checks.

For details see the final patch which introduces the documentation.

This series incorporates a version of the mlx5ctl interface previously
proposed:
  https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/

For this series the memory registration mechanism was removed, but I
expect it will come back.

It also includes the FWCL driver series from David:
  https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/


This is still waiting a 3rd fwctl driver and the CXL side to finish some
of its development. The github has the necessary CXL precursor patches.

There have been two LWN articles written discussing various aspects of
this proposal:

 https://lwn.net/Articles/955001/
 https://lwn.net/Articles/969383/

And a really giant ksummit thread:

 https://lore.kernel.org/ksummit/[email protected]/

Several have expressed general support for this concept:

 Broadcom Networking - https://lore.kernel.org/r/Zf2n02q0GevGdS-Z@C02YVCJELVCG
 Christoph Hellwig - https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
 Daniel Vetter - https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
 Enfabrica - https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]/
 NVIDIA Networking
 Oded Gabbay/Habana - https://lore.kernel.org/r/ZrMl1bkPP-3G9B4N@T14sgabbay.
 Oracle Linux - https://lore.kernel.org/r/6lakj6lxlxhdgrewodvj3xh6sxn3d36t5dab6najzyti2navx3@wrge7cyfk6nq
 SuSE/Hannes - https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Work is ongoing for a robust multi-device open source userspace, currently
the mlx5ctl_user that was posted by Saeed has been updated to use fwctl.

  https://github.com/saeedtx/mlx5ctl.git
  https://github.com/jgunthorpe/mlx5ctl.git

This is on github: https://github.com/jgunthorpe/linux/commits/fwctl

v3:
 - Rebase to v6.11-rc4
 - Add a squashed version of David's CXL series as the 2nd driver
 - Add missing includes
 - Improve comments based on feedback
 - Use the kdoc format that puts the member docs inside the struct
 - Rewrite fwctl_alloc_device() to be clearer
 - Incorporate all remarks for the documentation
v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
 - Rebase to v6.10-rc5
 - Minor style changes
 - Follow the style consensus for the guard stuff
 - Documentation grammer/spelling
 - Add missed length output for mlx5 get_info
 - Add two more missed MLX5 CMD's
 - Collect tags
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]

Cc: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
Cc: Aron Silverton <[email protected]>
Cc: Christoph Hellwig <[email protected]>
Cc: David Ahern <[email protected]>
Cc: Itay Avraham <[email protected]>
Cc: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
Cc: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <[email protected]>
Cc: Leonid Bloch <[email protected]>
Cc: Dan Williams <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
@CCX-Stingray
bnxt_en: add support for fwctl infrastructure
4391e88 
This patch adds basic support for the fwctl infrastructure.  With the
approriate tool, the most basic RPC to the bnxt_en firmware can be
called.

Signed-off-by: Andy Gospodarek <[email protected]>
@gospo gospo changed the base branch from linus to fwctl September 16, 2024 21:32
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 14, 2024
NFSv4: Prevent NULL-pointer dereference in nfs42_complete_copies()
a848c29 
On the node of an NFS client, some files saved in the mountpoint of the
NFS server were copied to another location of the same NFS server.
Accidentally, the nfs42_complete_copies() got a NULL-pointer dereference
crash with the following syslog:

[232064.838881] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116
[232064.839360] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116
[232066.588183] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000058
[232066.588586] Mem abort info:
[232066.588701]   ESR = 0x0000000096000007
[232066.588862]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[232066.589084]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[232066.589216]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[232066.589340]   FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault
[232066.589559] Data abort info:
[232066.589683]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[232066.589842]   CM = 0, WnR = 0
[232066.589967] user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00002000956ff400
[232066.590231] [0000000000000058] pgd=08001100ae100003, p4d=08001100ae100003, pud=08001100ae100003, pmd=08001100b3c00003, pte=0000000000000000
[232066.590757] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[232066.590958] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun ipt_rpfilter xt_multiport ip_set_hash_ip ip_set_hash_net xfrm_interface xfrm6_tunnel tunnel4 tunnel6 esp4 ah4 wireguard libcurve25519_generic veth xt_addrtype xt_set nf_conntrack_netlink ip_set_hash_ipportnet ip_set_hash_ipportip ip_set_bitmap_port ip_set_hash_ipport dummy ip_set ip_vs_sh ip_vs_wrr ip_vs_rr ip_vs iptable_filter sch_ingress nfnetlink_cttimeout vport_gre ip_gre ip_tunnel gre vport_geneve geneve vport_vxlan vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel openvswitch nf_conncount dm_round_robin dm_service_time dm_multipath xt_nat xt_MASQUERADE nft_chain_nat nf_nat xt_mark xt_conntrack xt_comment nft_compat nft_counter nf_tables nfnetlink ocfs2 ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_ssif nbd overlay 8021q garp mrp bonding tls rfkill sunrpc ext4 mbcache jbd2
[232066.591052]  vfat fat cas_cache cas_disk ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas sg acpi_ipmi ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ip_tables vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_virqfd vfio_iommu_type1 vfio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc fuse xfs libcrc32c ast drm_vram_helper qla2xxx drm_kms_helper syscopyarea crct10dif_ce sysfillrect ghash_ce sysimgblt sha2_ce fb_sys_fops cec sha256_arm64 sha1_ce drm_ttm_helper ttm nvme_fc igb sbsa_gwdt nvme_fabrics drm nvme_core i2c_algo_bit i40e scsi_transport_fc megaraid_sas aes_neon_bs
[232066.596953] CPU: 6 PID: 4124696 Comm: 10.253.166.125- Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.15.131-9.cl9_ocfs2.aarch64 #1
[232066.597356] Hardware name: Great Wall .\x93\x8e...RF6260 V5/GWMSSE2GL1T, BIOS T656FBE_V3.0.18 2024-01-06
[232066.597721] pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[232066.598034] pc : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4]
[232066.598327] lr : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x12c/0x800 [nfsv4]
[232066.598595] sp : ffff8000f568fc70
[232066.598731] x29: ffff8000f568fc70 x28: 0000000000001000 x27: ffff21003db33000
[232066.599030] x26: ffff800005521ae0 x25: ffff0100f98fa3f0 x24: 0000000000000001
[232066.599319] x23: ffff800009920008 x22: ffff21003db33040 x21: ffff21003db33050
[232066.599628] x20: ffff410172fe9e40 x19: ffff410172fe9e00 x18: 0000000000000000
[232066.599914] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000004 x15: 0000000000000000
[232066.600195] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800008e685a8 x12: 00000000eac0c6e6
[232066.600498] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000008 x9 : ffff8000054e5828
[232066.600784] x8 : 00000000ffffffbf x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 000000000a9eb14a
[232066.601062] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff70ff8a14a800 x3 : 0000000000000058
[232066.601348] x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 54dce46366daa6c6 x0 : 0000000000000000
[232066.601636] Call trace:
[232066.601749]  nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4]
[232066.601998]  nfs4_do_reclaim+0x1b8/0x28c [nfsv4]
[232066.602218]  nfs4_state_manager+0x928/0x10f0 [nfsv4]
[232066.602455]  nfs4_run_state_manager+0x78/0x1b0 [nfsv4]
[232066.602690]  kthread+0x110/0x114
[232066.602830]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[232066.602985] Code: 1400000d f9403f20 f9402e61 91016003 (f9402c00)
[232066.603284] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[232066.606936] Starting crashdump kernel...
[232066.607146] Bye!

Analysing the vmcore, we know that nfs4_copy_state listed by destination
nfs_server->ss_copies was added by the field copies in handle_async_copy(),
and we found a waiting copy process with the stack as:
PID: 3511963  TASK: ffff710028b47e00  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "cp"
 #0 [ffff8001116ef740] __switch_to at ffff8000081b92f4
 #1 [ffff8001116ef760] __schedule at ffff800008dd0650
 #2 [ffff8001116ef7c0] schedule at ffff800008dd0a00
 #3 [ffff8001116ef7e0] schedule_timeout at ffff800008dd6aa0
 #4 [ffff8001116ef860] __wait_for_common at ffff800008dd166c
 #5 [ffff8001116ef8e0] wait_for_completion_interruptible at ffff800008dd1898
 torvalds#6 [ffff8001116ef8f0] handle_async_copy at ffff8000055142f4 [nfsv4]
 torvalds#7 [ffff8001116ef970] _nfs42_proc_copy at ffff8000055147c8 [nfsv4]
 torvalds#8 [ffff8001116efa80] nfs42_proc_copy at ffff800005514cf0 [nfsv4]
 torvalds#9 [ffff8001116efc50] __nfs4_copy_file_range.constprop.0 at ffff8000054ed694 [nfsv4]

The NULL-pointer dereference was due to nfs42_complete_copies() listed
the nfs_server->ss_copies by the field ss_copies of nfs4_copy_state.
So the nfs4_copy_state address ffff0100f98fa3f0 was offset by 0x10 and
the data accessed through this pointer was also incorrect. Generally,
the ordered list nfs4_state_owner->so_states indicate open(O_RDWR) or
open(O_WRITE) states are reclaimed firstly by nfs4_reclaim_open_state().
When destination state reclaim is failed with NFS_STATE_RECOVERY_FAILED
and copies are not deleted in nfs_server->ss_copies, the source state
may be passed to the nfs42_complete_copies() process earlier, resulting
in this crash scene finally. To solve this issue, we add a list_head
nfs_server->ss_src_copies for a server-to-server copy specially.

Fixes: 0e65a32 ("NFS: handle source server reboot")
Signed-off-by: Yanjun Zhang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 23, 2024
@kuba-moo
mptcp: prevent MPC handshake on port-based signal endpoints
3d04139 
Syzkaller reported a lockdep splat:

  ============================================
  WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
  6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0 Not tainted
  --------------------------------------------
  syz-executor364/5113 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
  ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
  ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328

  other info that might help us debug this:
   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0
         ----
    lock(k-slock-AF_INET);
    lock(k-slock-AF_INET);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

   May be due to missing lock nesting notation

  7 locks held by syz-executor364/5113:
   #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline]
   #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg+0x153/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1806
   #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline]
   #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x11f/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1727
   #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline]
   #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline]
   #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x5f/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:470
   #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline]
   #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline]
   #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x45f/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228
   #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: local_lock_acquire include/linux/local_lock_internal.h:29 [inline]
   #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: process_backlog+0x33b/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6104
   #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline]
   #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline]
   #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_local_deliver_finish+0x230/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:232
   torvalds#6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
   torvalds#6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5113 Comm: syz-executor364 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
   dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119
   check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3061 [inline]
   validate_chain+0x15d3/0x5900 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3855
   __lock_acquire+0x137a/0x2040 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5142
   lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5759
   __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
   _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
   spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
   sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328
   mptcp_sk_clone_init+0x32/0x13c0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3279
   subflow_syn_recv_sock+0x931/0x1920 net/mptcp/subflow.c:874
   tcp_check_req+0xfe4/0x1a20 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:853
   tcp_v4_rcv+0x1c3e/0x37f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2267
   ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x22e/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
   ip_local_deliver_finish+0x341/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
   NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314
   NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314
   __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5661 [inline]
   __netif_receive_skb+0x2bf/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5775
   process_backlog+0x662/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6108
   __napi_poll+0xcb/0x490 net/core/dev.c:6772
   napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6841 [inline]
   net_rx_action+0x89b/0x1240 net/core/dev.c:6963
   handle_softirqs+0x2c4/0x970 kernel/softirq.c:554
   do_softirq+0x11b/0x1e0 kernel/softirq.c:455
   </IRQ>
   <TASK>
   __local_bh_enable_ip+0x1bb/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:382
   local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
   rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:908 [inline]
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x1763/0x3e90 net/core/dev.c:4450
   dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3105 [inline]
   neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:526 [inline]
   neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:540 [inline]
   ip_finish_output2+0xd41/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235
   ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 [inline]
   __ip_queue_xmit+0x118c/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:535
   __tcp_transmit_skb+0x2544/0x3b30 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1466
   tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6542 [inline]
   tcp_rcv_state_process+0x2c32/0x4570 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6729
   tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x77d/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1934
   sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1111 [inline]
   __release_sock+0x214/0x350 net/core/sock.c:3004
   release_sock+0x61/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:3558
   mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x1ad/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1733
   mptcp_sendmsg+0x1884/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1812
   sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
   __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745
   ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597
   ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline]
   __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x740 net/socket.c:2737
   __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2766 [inline]
   __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2763 [inline]
   __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2763
   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
  RIP: 0033:0x7f04fb13a6b9
  Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 01 1a 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
  RSP: 002b:00007ffd651f42d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f04fb13a6b9
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000d00 RDI: 0000000000000004
  RBP: 00007ffd651f4310 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
  R10: 0000000020000080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000f4240
  R13: 00007f04fb187449 R14: 00007ffd651f42f4 R15: 00007ffd651f4300
   </TASK>

As noted by Cong Wang, the splat is false positive, but the code
path leading to the report is an unexpected one: a client is
attempting an MPC handshake towards the in-kernel listener created
by the in-kernel PM for a port based signal endpoint.

Such connection will be never accepted; many of them can make the
listener queue full and preventing the creation of MPJ subflow via
such listener - its intended role.

Explicitly detect this scenario at initial-syn time and drop the
incoming MPC request.

Fixes: 1729cf1 ("mptcp: create the listening socket for new port")
Cc: [email protected]
Reported-by: [email protected]
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f4aacdfef2c6a6529c3e
Cc: Cong Wang <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Mat Martineau <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 4, 2024
Merge branch 'fixes-for-bits-iterator'
053b212 
Hou Tao says:

====================
The patch set fixes several issues in bits iterator. Patch #1 fixes the
kmemleak problem of bits iterator. Patch #2~#3 fix the overflow problem
of nr_bits. Patch #4 fixes the potential stack corruption when bits
iterator is used on 32-bit host. Patch #5 adds more test cases for bits
iterator.

Please see the individual patches for more details. And comments are
always welcome.
---
v4:
 * patch #1: add ack from Yafang
 * patch #3: revert code-churn like changes:
   (1) compute nr_bytes and nr_bits before the check of nr_words.
   (2) use nr_bits == 64 to check for single u64, preventing build
       warning on 32-bit hosts.
 * patch #4: use "BITS_PER_LONG == 32" instead of "!defined(CONFIG_64BIT)"

v3: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]/T/#t
  * split the bits-iterator related patches from "Misc fixes for bpf"
    patch set
  * patch #1: use "!nr_bits || bits >= nr_bits" to stop the iteration
  * patch #2: add a new helper for the overflow problem
  * patch #3: decrease the limitation from 512 to 511 and check whether
    nr_bytes is too large for bpf memory allocator explicitly
  * patch #5: add two more test cases for bit iterator

v2: http://lore.kernel.org/bpf/[email protected]
====================

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 4, 2024
@kuba-moo
Merge branch 'mlxsw-fixes'
b919f1e 
Petr Machata says:

====================
mlxsw: Fixes

In this patchset:

- Tx header should be pushed for each packet which is transmitted via
  Spectrum ASICs. Patch #1 adds a missing call to skb_cow_head() to make
  sure that there is both enough room to push the Tx header and that the
  SKB header is not cloned and can be modified.

- Commit b5b60bb ("mlxsw: pci: Use page pool for Rx buffers
  allocation") converted mlxsw to use page pool for Rx buffers allocation.
  Sync for CPU and for device should be done for Rx pages. In patches #2
  and #3, add the missing calls to sync pages for, respectively, CPU and
  the device.

- Patch #4 then fixes a bug to IPv6 GRE forwarding offload. Patch #5 adds
  a generic forwarding test that fails with mlxsw ports prior to the fix.
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 18, 2024
@akpm00
sched/task_stack: fix object_is_on_stack() for KASAN tagged pointers
fd7b4f9 
When CONFIG_KASAN_SW_TAGS and CONFIG_KASAN_STACK are enabled, the
object_is_on_stack() function may produce incorrect results due to the
presence of tags in the obj pointer, while the stack pointer does not have
tags.  This discrepancy can lead to incorrect stack object detection and
subsequently trigger warnings if CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS is also enabled.

Example of the warning:

ODEBUG: object 3eff800082ea7bb0 is NOT on stack ffff800082ea0000, but annotated.
------------[ cut here ]------------
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at lib/debugobjects.c:557 __debug_object_init+0x330/0x364
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc5 #4
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
pstate: 600000c5 (nZCv daIF -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __debug_object_init+0x330/0x364
lr : __debug_object_init+0x330/0x364
sp : ffff800082ea7b40
x29: ffff800082ea7b40 x28: 98ff0000c0164518 x27: 98ff0000c0164534
x26: ffff800082d93ec8 x25: 0000000000000001 x24: 1cff0000c00172a0
x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff800082d93ed0 x21: ffff800081a24418
x20: 3eff800082ea7bb0 x19: efff800000000000 x18: 0000000000000000
x17: 00000000000000ff x16: 0000000000000047 x15: 206b63617473206e
x14: 0000000000000018 x13: ffff800082ea7780 x12: 0ffff800082ea78e
x11: 0ffff800082ea790 x10: 0ffff800082ea79d x9 : 34d77febe173e800
x8 : 34d77febe173e800 x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 0000000000000001
x5 : feff800082ea74b8 x4 : ffff800082870a90 x3 : ffff80008018d3c4
x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : ffff800082858810 x0 : 0000000000000050
Call trace:
 __debug_object_init+0x330/0x364
 debug_object_init_on_stack+0x30/0x3c
 schedule_hrtimeout_range_clock+0xac/0x26c
 schedule_hrtimeout+0x1c/0x30
 wait_task_inactive+0x1d4/0x25c
 kthread_bind_mask+0x28/0x98
 init_rescuer+0x1e8/0x280
 workqueue_init+0x1a0/0x3cc
 kernel_init_freeable+0x118/0x200
 kernel_init+0x28/0x1f0
 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
ODEBUG: object 3eff800082ea7bb0 is NOT on stack ffff800082ea0000, but annotated.
------------[ cut here ]------------

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Qun-Wei Lin <[email protected]>
Cc: Andrew Yang <[email protected]>
Cc: AngeloGioacchino Del Regno <[email protected]>
Cc: Casper Li <[email protected]>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <[email protected]>
Cc: Chinwen Chang <[email protected]>
Cc: Kent Overstreet <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthias Brugger <[email protected]>
Cc: Pasha Tatashin <[email protected]>
Cc: Shakeel Butt <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 2, 2024
@mcgrof
tests/module/gen_test_kallsyms.sh: use 0 value for variables
2466b31 
Use 0 for the values as we use them for the return value on init
to keep the test modules simple. This fixes a splat reported

do_init_module: 'test_kallsyms_b'->init suspiciously returned 255, it should follow 0/-E convention
do_init_module: loading module anyway...
CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 1873 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #4
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 2024.08-1 09/18/2024
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x80
 do_init_module.cold+0x21/0x26
 init_module_from_file+0x88/0xf0
 idempotent_init_module+0x108/0x300
 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x5a/0xb0
 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7f4f3a718839
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff>
RSP: 002b:00007fff97d1a9e8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055b94001ab90 RCX: 00007f4f3a718839
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 000055b910e68a10 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 00007f4f3a7f1b20 R09: 000055b94001c5b0
R10: 0000000000000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000055b910e68a10
R13: 0000000000040000 R14: 000055b94001ad60 R15: 0000000000000000
 </TASK>
do_init_module: 'test_kallsyms_b'->init suspiciously returned 255, it should follow 0/-E convention
do_init_module: loading module anyway...
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1884 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.12.0-rc3+ #4
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 2024.08-1 09/18/2024
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x56/0x80
 do_init_module.cold+0x21/0x26
 init_module_from_file+0x88/0xf0
 idempotent_init_module+0x108/0x300
 __x64_sys_finit_module+0x5a/0xb0
 do_syscall_64+0x4b/0x110
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x7ffaa5d18839

Reported-by: Sami Tolvanen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sami Tolvanen <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Luis Chamberlain <[email protected]>
@jgunthorpe jgunthorpe force-pushed the fwctl branch 3 times, most recently from 1fdf145 to 4032570 Compare March 22, 2025 00:02
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 2, 2025
@namhyung
perf report: Fix a memory leak for perf_env on AMD
9daa05c 
The env.pmu_mapping can be leaked when it reads data from a pipe on AMD.
For a pipe data, it reads the header data including pmu_mapping from
PERF_RECORD_HEADER_FEATURE runtime.  But it's already set in:

  perf_session__new()
    __perf_session__new()
      evlist__init_trace_event_sample_raw()
        evlist__has_amd_ibs()
          perf_env__nr_pmu_mappings()

Then it'll overwrite that when it processes the HEADER_FEATURE record.
Here's a report from address sanitizer.

  Direct leak of 2689 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7fed8f814596 in realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98
    #1 0x5595a7d416b1 in strbuf_grow util/strbuf.c:64
    #2 0x5595a7d414ef in strbuf_init util/strbuf.c:25
    #3 0x5595a7d0f4b7 in perf_env__read_pmu_mappings util/env.c:362
    #4 0x5595a7d12ab7 in perf_env__nr_pmu_mappings util/env.c:517
    #5 0x5595a7d89d2f in evlist__has_amd_ibs util/amd-sample-raw.c:315
    torvalds#6 0x5595a7d87fb2 in evlist__init_trace_event_sample_raw util/sample-raw.c:23
    torvalds#7 0x5595a7d7f893 in __perf_session__new util/session.c:179
    torvalds#8 0x5595a7b79572 in perf_session__new util/session.h:115
    torvalds#9 0x5595a7b7e9dc in cmd_report builtin-report.c:1603
    torvalds#10 0x5595a7c019eb in run_builtin perf.c:351
    torvalds#11 0x5595a7c01c92 in handle_internal_command perf.c:404
    torvalds#12 0x5595a7c01deb in run_argv perf.c:448
    torvalds#13 0x5595a7c02134 in main perf.c:556
    torvalds#14 0x7fed85833d67 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58

Let's free the existing pmu_mapping data if any.

Cc: Ravi Bangoria <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 7, 2025
@fatherMatrix
dm: fix unconditional IO throttle caused by REQ_PREFLUSH
88f7f56 
When a bio with REQ_PREFLUSH is submitted to dm, __send_empty_flush()
generates a flush_bio with REQ_OP_WRITE | REQ_PREFLUSH | REQ_SYNC,
which causes the flush_bio to be throttled by wbt_wait().

An example from v5.4, similar problem also exists in upstream:

    crash> bt 2091206
    PID: 2091206  TASK: ffff2050df92a300  CPU: 109  COMMAND: "kworker/u260:0"
     #0 [ffff800084a2f7f0] __switch_to at ffff80004008aeb8
     #1 [ffff800084a2f820] __schedule at ffff800040bfa0c4
     #2 [ffff800084a2f880] schedule at ffff800040bfa4b4
     #3 [ffff800084a2f8a0] io_schedule at ffff800040bfa9c4
     #4 [ffff800084a2f8c0] rq_qos_wait at ffff8000405925bc
     #5 [ffff800084a2f940] wbt_wait at ffff8000405bb3a0
     torvalds#6 [ffff800084a2f9a0] __rq_qos_throttle at ffff800040592254
     torvalds#7 [ffff800084a2f9c0] blk_mq_make_request at ffff80004057cf38
     torvalds#8 [ffff800084a2fa60] generic_make_request at ffff800040570138
     torvalds#9 [ffff800084a2fae0] submit_bio at ffff8000405703b4
    torvalds#10 [ffff800084a2fb50] xlog_write_iclog at ffff800001280834 [xfs]
    torvalds#11 [ffff800084a2fbb0] xlog_sync at ffff800001280c3c [xfs]
    torvalds#12 [ffff800084a2fbf0] xlog_state_release_iclog at ffff800001280df4 [xfs]
    torvalds#13 [ffff800084a2fc10] xlog_write at ffff80000128203c [xfs]
    torvalds#14 [ffff800084a2fcd0] xlog_cil_push at ffff8000012846dc [xfs]
    torvalds#15 [ffff800084a2fda0] xlog_cil_push_work at ffff800001284a2c [xfs]
    torvalds#16 [ffff800084a2fdb0] process_one_work at ffff800040111d08
    torvalds#17 [ffff800084a2fe00] worker_thread at ffff8000401121cc
    torvalds#18 [ffff800084a2fe70] kthread at ffff800040118de4

After commit 2def284 ("xfs: don't allow log IO to be throttled"),
the metadata submitted by xlog_write_iclog() should not be throttled.
But due to the existence of the dm layer, throttling flush_bio indirectly
causes the metadata bio to be throttled.

Fix this by conditionally adding REQ_IDLE to flush_bio.bi_opf, which makes
wbt_should_throttle() return false to avoid wbt_wait().

Signed-off-by: Jinliang Zheng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Tianxiang Peng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Hao Peng <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Mikulas Patocka <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 7, 2025
@kuba-moo
net: ibmveth: make veth_pool_store stop hanging
053f3ff 
v2:
- Created a single error handling unlock and exit in veth_pool_store
- Greatly expanded commit message with previous explanatory-only text

Summary: Use rtnl_mutex to synchronize veth_pool_store with itself,
ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open, preventing multiple calls in a row to
napi_disable.

Background: Two (or more) threads could call veth_pool_store through
writing to /sys/devices/vio/30000002/pool*/*. You can do this easily
with a little shell script. This causes a hang.

I configured LOCKDEP, compiled ibmveth.c with DEBUG, and built a new
kernel. I ran this test again and saw:

    Setting pool0/active to 0
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    [   73.911067][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    Setting pool1/active to 1
    Setting pool1/active to 0
    [   73.911367][ T4366] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close starting
    [   73.916056][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: close complete
    [   73.916064][ T4365] ibmveth 30000002 eth0: open starting
    [  110.808564][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  230.808495][  T712] systemd-journald[712]: Sent WATCHDOG=1 notification.
    [  243.683786][  T123] INFO: task stress.sh:4365 blocked for more than 122 seconds.
    [  243.683827][  T123]       Not tainted 6.14.0-01103-g2df0c02dab82-dirty torvalds#8
    [  243.683833][  T123] "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
    [  243.683838][  T123] task:stress.sh       state:D stack:28096 pid:4365  tgid:4365  ppid:4364   task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00042000
    [  243.683852][  T123] Call Trace:
    [  243.683857][  T123] [c00000000c38f690] [0000000000000001] 0x1 (unreliable)
    [  243.683868][  T123] [c00000000c38f840] [c00000000001f908] __switch_to+0x318/0x4e0
    [  243.683878][  T123] [c00000000c38f8a0] [c000000001549a70] __schedule+0x500/0x12a0
    [  243.683888][  T123] [c00000000c38f9a0] [c00000000154a878] schedule+0x68/0x210
    [  243.683896][  T123] [c00000000c38f9d0] [c00000000154ac80] schedule_preempt_disabled+0x30/0x50
    [  243.683904][  T123] [c00000000c38fa00] [c00000000154dbb0] __mutex_lock+0x730/0x10f0
    [  243.683913][  T123] [c00000000c38fb10] [c000000001154d40] napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.683921][  T123] [c00000000c38fb40] [c000000000f4ae94] ibmveth_open+0x68/0x5dc
    [  243.683928][  T123] [c00000000c38fbe0] [c000000000f4aa20] veth_pool_store+0x220/0x270
    [  243.683936][  T123] [c00000000c38fc70] [c000000000826278] sysfs_kf_write+0x68/0xb0
    [  243.683944][  T123] [c00000000c38fcb0] [c0000000008240b8] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x198/0x2d0
    [  243.683951][  T123] [c00000000c38fd00] [c00000000071b9ac] vfs_write+0x34c/0x650
    [  243.683958][  T123] [c00000000c38fdc0] [c00000000071bea8] ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.683966][  T123] [c00000000c38fe10] [c0000000000317f4] system_call_exception+0x124/0x340
    [  243.683973][  T123] [c00000000c38fe50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
    ...
    [  243.684087][  T123] Showing all locks held in the system:
    [  243.684095][  T123] 1 lock held by khungtaskd/123:
    [  243.684099][  T123]  #0: c00000000278e370 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x50/0x248
    [  243.684114][  T123] 4 locks held by stress.sh/4365:
    [  243.684119][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684132][  T123]  #1: c000000041aea888 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684143][  T123]  #2: c0000000366fb9a8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684155][  T123]  #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_enable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684166][  T123] 5 locks held by stress.sh/4366:
    [  243.684170][  T123]  #0: c00000003a4cd3f8 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x88/0x150
    [  243.684183][  T123]  #1: c00000000aee2288 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x154/0x2d0
    [  243.684194][  T123]  #2: c0000000366f4ba8 (kn->active#64){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x160/0x2d0
    [  243.684205][  T123]  #3: c000000035ff4cb8 (&dev->lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: napi_disable+0x30/0x60
    [  243.684216][  T123]  #4: c0000003ff9bbf18 (&rq->__lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: __schedule+0x138/0x12a0

From the ibmveth debug, two threads are calling veth_pool_store, which
calls ibmveth_close and ibmveth_open. Here's the sequence:

  T4365             T4366
  ----------------- ----------------- ---------
  veth_pool_store   veth_pool_store
                    ibmveth_close
  ibmveth_close
  napi_disable
                    napi_disable
  ibmveth_open
  napi_enable                         <- HANG

ibmveth_close calls napi_disable at the top and ibmveth_open calls
napi_enable at the top.

https://docs.kernel.org/networking/napi.html]] says

  The control APIs are not idempotent. Control API calls are safe
  against concurrent use of datapath APIs but an incorrect sequence of
  control API calls may result in crashes, deadlocks, or race
  conditions. For example, calling napi_disable() multiple times in a
  row will deadlock.

In the normal open and close paths, rtnl_mutex is acquired to prevent
other callers. This is missing from veth_pool_store. Use rtnl_mutex in
veth_pool_store fixes these hangs.

Signed-off-by: Dave Marquardt <[email protected]>
Fixes: 860f242 ("[PATCH] ibmveth change buffer pools dynamically")
Reviewed-by: Nick Child <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 11, 2025
@chenhuacai @alexdeucher
drm/amd/display: Protect FPU in dml2_validate()/dml21_validate()
366e77c 
Commit 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context
start") removes the FP context protection of dml2_create(), and it said
"All the DC_FP_START/END should be used before call anything from DML2".

However, dml2_validate()/dml21_validate() are not protected from their
callers, causing such errors:

 do_fpu invoked from kernel context![#1]:
 CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 331 Comm: kworker/10:1H Not tainted 6.14.0-rc6+ #4
 Workqueue: events_highpri dm_irq_work_func [amdgpu]
 pc ffff800003191eb0 ra ffff800003191e60 tp 9000000107a94000 sp 9000000107a975b0
 a0 9000000140ce4910 a1 0000000000000000 a2 9000000140ce49b0 a3 9000000140ce49a8
 a4 9000000140ce49a8 a5 0000000100000000 a6 0000000000000001 a7 9000000107a97660
 t0 ffff800003790000 t1 9000000140ce5000 t2 0000000000000001 t3 0000000000000000
 t4 0000000000000004 t5 0000000000000000 t6 0000000000000000 t7 0000000000000000
 t8 0000000100000000 u0 ffff8000031a3b9c s9 9000000130bc0000 s0 9000000132400000
 s1 9000000140ec0000 s2 9000000132400000 s3 9000000140ce0000 s4 90000000057f8b88
 s5 9000000140ec0000 s6 9000000140ce4910 s7 0000000000000001 s8 9000000130d45010
 ra: ffff800003191e60 dml21_map_dc_state_into_dml_display_cfg+0x40/0x1140 [amdgpu]
   ERA: ffff800003191eb0 dml21_map_dc_state_into_dml_display_cfg+0x90/0x1140 [amdgpu]
  CRMD: 000000b0 (PLV0 -IE -DA +PG DACF=CC DACM=CC -WE)
  PRMD: 00000004 (PPLV0 +PIE -PWE)
  EUEN: 00000000 (-FPE -SXE -ASXE -BTE)
  ECFG: 00071c1d (LIE=0,2-4,10-12 VS=7)
 ESTAT: 000f0000 [FPD] (IS= ECode=15 EsubCode=0)
  PRID: 0014d010 (Loongson-64bit, Loongson-3C6000/S)
 Process kworker/10:1H (pid: 331, threadinfo=000000007bf9ddb0, task=00000000cc4ab9f3)
 Stack : 0000000100000000 0000043800000780 0000000100000001 0000000100000001
         0000000000000000 0000078000000000 0000000000000438 0000078000000000
         0000000000000438 0000078000000000 0000000000000438 0000000100000000
         0000000100000000 0000000100000000 0000000100000000 0000000100000000
         0000000000000001 9000000140ec0000 9000000132400000 9000000132400000
         ffff800003408000 ffff800003408000 9000000132400000 9000000140ce0000
         9000000140ce0000 ffff800003193850 0000000000000001 9000000140ec0000
         9000000132400000 9000000140ec0860 9000000140ec0738 0000000000000001
         90000001405e8000 9000000130bc0000 9000000140ec02a8 ffff8000031b5db8
         0000000000000000 0000043800000780 0000000000000003 ffff8000031b79cc
         ...
 Call Trace:
 [<ffff800003191eb0>] dml21_map_dc_state_into_dml_display_cfg+0x90/0x1140 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff80000319384c>] dml21_validate+0xcc/0x520 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff8000031b8948>] dc_validate_global_state+0x2e8/0x460 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002e94034>] create_validate_stream_for_sink+0x3d4/0x420 [amdgpu]
 [<ffff800002e940e4>] amdgpu_dm_connector_mode_valid+0x64/0x240 [amdgpu]
 [<900000000441d6b8>] drm_connector_mode_valid+0x38/0x80
 [<900000000441d824>] __drm_helper_update_and_validate+0x124/0x3e0
 [<900000000441ddc0>] drm_helper_probe_single_connector_modes+0x2e0/0x620
 [<90000000044050dc>] drm_client_modeset_probe+0x23c/0x1780
 [<9000000004420384>] __drm_fb_helper_initial_config_and_unlock+0x44/0x5a0
 [<9000000004403acc>] drm_client_dev_hotplug+0xcc/0x140
 [<ffff800002e9ab50>] handle_hpd_irq_helper+0x1b0/0x1e0 [amdgpu]
 [<90000000038f5da0>] process_one_work+0x160/0x300
 [<90000000038f6718>] worker_thread+0x318/0x440
 [<9000000003901b8c>] kthread+0x12c/0x220
 [<90000000038b1484>] ret_from_kernel_thread+0x8/0xa4

Unfortunately, protecting dml2_validate()/dml21_validate() out of DML2
causes "sleeping function called from invalid context", so protect them
with DC_FP_START() and DC_FP_END() inside.

Fixes: 7da55c2 ("drm/amd/display: Remove incorrect FP context start")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Huacai Chen <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Dongyan Qian <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Aurabindo Pillai <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Daniel Wheeler <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 14, 2025
@davidhildenbrand @hcahca
s390/virtio_ccw: Don't allocate/assign airqs for non-existing queues
2ccd42b 
If we finds a vq without a name in our input array in
virtio_ccw_find_vqs(), we treat it as "non-existing" and set the vq pointer
to NULL; we will not call virtio_ccw_setup_vq() to allocate/setup a vq.

Consequently, we create only a queue if it actually exists (name != NULL)
and assign an incremental queue index to each such existing queue.

However, in virtio_ccw_register_adapter_ind()->get_airq_indicator() we
will not ignore these "non-existing queues", but instead assign an airq
indicator to them.

Besides never releasing them in virtio_ccw_drop_indicators() (because
there is no virtqueue), the bigger issue seems to be that there will be a
disagreement between the device and the Linux guest about the airq
indicator to be used for notifying a queue, because the indicator bit
for adapter I/O interrupt is derived from the queue index.

The virtio spec states under "Setting Up Two-Stage Queue Indicators":

	... indicator contains the guest address of an area wherein the
	indicators for the devices are contained, starting at bit_nr, one
	bit per virtqueue of the device.

And further in "Notification via Adapter I/O Interrupts":

	For notifying the driver of virtqueue buffers, the device sets the
	bit in the guest-provided indicator area at the corresponding
	offset.

For example, QEMU uses in virtio_ccw_notify() the queue index (passed as
"vector") to select the relevant indicator bit. If a queue does not exist,
it does not have a corresponding indicator bit assigned, because it
effectively doesn't have a queue index.

Using a virtio-balloon-ccw device under QEMU with free-page-hinting
disabled ("free-page-hint=off") but free-page-reporting enabled
("free-page-reporting=on") will result in free page reporting
not working as expected: in the virtio_balloon driver, we'll be stuck
forever in virtballoon_free_page_report()->wait_event(), because the
waitqueue will not be woken up as the notification from the device is
lost: it would use the wrong indicator bit.

Free page reporting stops working and we get splats (when configured to
detect hung wqs) like:

 INFO: task kworker/1:3:463 blocked for more than 61 seconds.
       Not tainted 6.14.0 #4
 "echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
 task:kworker/1:3 [...]
 Workqueue: events page_reporting_process
 Call Trace:
  [<000002f404e6dfb2>] __schedule+0x402/0x1640
  [<000002f404e6f22e>] schedule+0x3e/0xe0
  [<000002f3846a88fa>] virtballoon_free_page_report+0xaa/0x110 [virtio_balloon]
  [<000002f40435c8a4>] page_reporting_process+0x2e4/0x740
  [<000002f403fd3ee2>] process_one_work+0x1c2/0x400
  [<000002f403fd4b96>] worker_thread+0x296/0x420
  [<000002f403fe10b4>] kthread+0x124/0x290
  [<000002f403f4e0dc>] __ret_from_fork+0x3c/0x60
  [<000002f404e77272>] ret_from_fork+0xa/0x38

There was recently a discussion [1] whether the "holes" should be
treated differently again, effectively assigning also non-existing
queues a queue index: that should also fix the issue, but requires other
workarounds to not break existing setups.

Let's fix it without affecting existing setups for now by properly ignoring
the non-existing queues, so the indicator bits will match the queue
indexes.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/

Fixes: a229989 ("virtio: don't allocate vqs when names[i] = NULL")
Reported-by: Chandra Merla <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 28, 2025
@naota @kdave
btrfs: zoned: skip reporting zone for new block group
866bafa 
There is a potential deadlock if we do report zones in an IO context, detailed
in below lockdep report. When one process do a report zones and another process
freezes the block device, the report zones side cannot allocate a tag because
the freeze is already started. This can thus result in new block group creation
to hang forever, blocking the write path.

Thankfully, a new block group should be created on empty zones. So, reporting
the zones is not necessary and we can set the write pointer = 0 and load the
zone capacity from the block layer using bdev_zone_capacity() helper.

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 6.14.0-rc1 torvalds#252 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 modprobe/1110 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff888100ac83e0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)torvalds#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #3 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)torvalds#16){++++}-{0:0}:
        blk_queue_enter+0x3d9/0x500
        blk_mq_alloc_request+0x47d/0x8e0
        scsi_execute_cmd+0x14f/0xb80
        sd_zbc_do_report_zones+0x1c1/0x470
        sd_zbc_report_zones+0x362/0xd60
        blkdev_report_zones+0x1b1/0x2e0
        btrfs_get_dev_zones+0x215/0x7e0 [btrfs]
        btrfs_load_block_group_zone_info+0x6d2/0x2c10 [btrfs]
        btrfs_make_block_group+0x36b/0x870 [btrfs]
        btrfs_create_chunk+0x147d/0x2320 [btrfs]
        btrfs_chunk_alloc+0x2ce/0xcf0 [btrfs]
        start_transaction+0xce6/0x1620 [btrfs]
        btrfs_uuid_scan_kthread+0x4ee/0x5b0 [btrfs]
        kthread+0x39d/0x750
        ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #2 (&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem){++++}-{4:4}:
        down_read+0x9b/0x470
        btrfs_map_block+0x2ce/0x2ce0 [btrfs]
        btrfs_submit_chunk+0x2d4/0x16c0 [btrfs]
        btrfs_submit_bbio+0x16/0x30 [btrfs]
        btree_write_cache_pages+0xb5a/0xf90 [btrfs]
        do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0
        __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00
        writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00
        wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800
        wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0
        process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460
        worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0
        kthread+0x39d/0x750
        ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #1 (&fs_info->zoned_meta_io_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}:
        __mutex_lock+0x1aa/0x1360
        btree_write_cache_pages+0x252/0xf90 [btrfs]
        do_writepages+0x17f/0x7b0
        __writeback_single_inode+0x114/0xb00
        writeback_sb_inodes+0x52b/0xe00
        wb_writeback+0x1a7/0x800
        wb_workfn+0x12a/0xbd0
        process_one_work+0x85a/0x1460
        worker_thread+0x5e2/0xfc0
        kthread+0x39d/0x750
        ret_from_fork+0x30/0x70
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
        __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0
        lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540
        __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60
        wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0
        bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0
        del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20
        sd_remove+0x85/0x130
        device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520
        bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
        device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0
        __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340
        scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170
        scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0
        sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug]
        device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520
        bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
        device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0
        device_unregister+0x13/0xa0
        sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug]
        scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug]
        __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520
        do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   (work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work) --> &fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem --> &q->q_usage_counter(queue)torvalds#16

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)torvalds#16);
                                lock(&fs_info->dev_replace.rwsem);
                                lock(&q->q_usage_counter(queue)torvalds#16);
   lock((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work));

  *** DEADLOCK ***

 5 locks held by modprobe/1110:
  #0: ffff88811f7bc108 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520
  #1: ffff8881022ee0e0 (&shost->scan_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: scsi_remove_host+0x20/0x2a0
  #2: ffff88811b4c4378 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x8f/0x520
  #3: ffff8881205b6f20 (&q->q_usage_counter(queue)torvalds#16){++++}-{0:0}, at: sd_remove+0x85/0x130
  #4: ffffffffa3284360 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: __flush_work+0xda/0xb60

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1110 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.14.0-rc1 torvalds#252
 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-3.fc41 04/01/2014
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x6a/0x90
  print_circular_bug.cold+0x1e0/0x274
  check_noncircular+0x306/0x3f0
  ? __pfx_check_noncircular+0x10/0x10
  ? mark_lock+0xf5/0x1650
  ? __pfx_check_irq_usage+0x10/0x10
  ? lockdep_lock+0xca/0x1c0
  ? __pfx_lockdep_lock+0x10/0x10
  __lock_acquire+0x2f52/0x5ea0
  ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10
  lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x540
  ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60
  ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_lock_release+0x10/0x10
  ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0
  ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60
  __flush_work+0x3ac/0xb60
  ? __flush_work+0x38f/0xb60
  ? __pfx_mark_lock+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx___flush_work+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx___might_resched+0x10/0x10
  ? mark_held_locks+0x94/0xe0
  wb_shutdown+0x15b/0x1f0
  bdi_unregister+0x172/0x5b0
  ? __pfx_bdi_unregister+0x10/0x10
  ? up_write+0x1ba/0x510
  del_gendisk+0x841/0xa20
  ? __pfx_del_gendisk+0x10/0x10
  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x35/0x60
  ? __pm_runtime_resume+0x79/0x110
  sd_remove+0x85/0x130
  device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520
  ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0
  bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
  device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0
  ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10
  __scsi_remove_device+0x272/0x340
  scsi_forget_host+0xf7/0x170
  scsi_remove_host+0xd2/0x2a0
  sdebug_driver_remove+0x52/0x2f0 [scsi_debug]
  ? kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xc0/0xf0
  device_release_driver_internal+0x368/0x520
  ? kobject_put+0x5d/0x4a0
  bus_remove_device+0x1f1/0x3f0
  device_del+0x3bd/0x9c0
  ? __pfx_device_del+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
  device_unregister+0x13/0xa0
  sdebug_do_remove_host+0x1fb/0x290 [scsi_debug]
  scsi_debug_exit+0x17/0x70 [scsi_debug]
  __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x321/0x520
  ? __pfx___do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_slab_free_after_rcu_debug+0x10/0x10
  ? kasan_save_stack+0x2c/0x50
  ? kasan_record_aux_stack+0xa3/0xb0
  ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0xc4/0xfb0
  ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590
  ? __x64_sys_close+0x78/0xd0
  do_syscall_64+0x93/0x180
  ? lock_is_held_type+0xd5/0x130
  ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
  ? __call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x3c0/0xfb0
  ? __pfx___call_rcu_common.constprop.0+0x10/0x10
  ? kmem_cache_free+0x3a0/0x590
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
  ? __pfx___x64_sys_openat+0x10/0x10
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x16d/0x400
  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on+0x78/0x100
  ? do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x180
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
 RIP: 0033:0x7f436712b68b
 RSP: 002b:00007ffe9f1a8658 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000b0
 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005559b367fd80 RCX: 00007f436712b68b
 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000800 RDI: 00005559b367fde8
 RBP: 00007ffe9f1a8680 R08: 1999999999999999 R09: 0000000000000000
 R10: 00007f43671a5fe0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 0000000000000000
 R13: 00007ffe9f1a86b0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
  </TASK>

Reported-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]>
CC: <[email protected]> # 6.13+
Tested-by: Shin'ichiro Kawasaki <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Damien Le Moal <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Naohiro Aota <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 13, 2025
@akpm00
mm/huge_memory: fix dereferencing invalid pmd migration entry
be6e843 
When migrating a THP, concurrent access to the PMD migration entry during
a deferred split scan can lead to an invalid address access, as
illustrated below.  To prevent this invalid access, it is necessary to
check the PMD migration entry and return early.  In this context, there is
no need to use pmd_to_swp_entry and pfn_swap_entry_to_page to verify the
equality of the target folio.  Since the PMD migration entry is locked, it
cannot be served as the target.

Mailing list discussion and explanation from Hugh Dickins: "An anon_vma
lookup points to a location which may contain the folio of interest, but
might instead contain another folio: and weeding out those other folios is
precisely what the "folio != pmd_folio((*pmd)" check (and the "risk of
replacing the wrong folio" comment a few lines above it) is for."

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffea60001db008
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 2199114 Comm: tee Not tainted 6.14.0+ #4 NONE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:split_huge_pmd_locked+0x3b5/0x2b60
Call Trace:
<TASK>
try_to_migrate_one+0x28c/0x3730
rmap_walk_anon+0x4f6/0x770
unmap_folio+0x196/0x1f0
split_huge_page_to_list_to_order+0x9f6/0x1560
deferred_split_scan+0xac5/0x12a0
shrinker_debugfs_scan_write+0x376/0x470
full_proxy_write+0x15c/0x220
vfs_write+0x2fc/0xcb0
ksys_write+0x146/0x250
do_syscall_64+0x6a/0x120
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The bug is found by syzkaller on an internal kernel, then confirmed on
upstream.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Fixes: 84c3fc4 ("mm: thp: check pmd migration entry in common path")
Signed-off-by: Gavin Guo <[email protected]>
Acked-by: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Zi Yan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Gavin Shan <[email protected]>
Cc: Florent Revest <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <[email protected]>
Cc: Miaohe Lin <[email protected]>
Cc: <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 15, 2025
@pchelkin91 @nbd168
wifi: mt76: disable napi on driver removal
78ab4be 
A warning on driver removal started occurring after commit 9dd05df
("net: warn if NAPI instance wasn't shut down"). Disable tx napi before
deleting it in mt76_dma_cleanup().

 WARNING: CPU: 4 PID: 18828 at net/core/dev.c:7288 __netif_napi_del_locked+0xf0/0x100
 CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 18828 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.15.0-rc4 #4 PREEMPT(lazy)
 Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME X670E-PRO WIFI, BIOS 3035 09/05/2024
 RIP: 0010:__netif_napi_del_locked+0xf0/0x100
 Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 mt76_dma_cleanup+0x54/0x2f0 [mt76]
 mt7921_pci_remove+0xd5/0x190 [mt7921e]
 pci_device_remove+0x47/0xc0
 device_release_driver_internal+0x19e/0x200
 driver_detach+0x48/0x90
 bus_remove_driver+0x6d/0xf0
 pci_unregister_driver+0x2e/0xb0
 __do_sys_delete_module.isra.0+0x197/0x2e0
 do_syscall_64+0x7b/0x160
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Tested with mt7921e but the same pattern can be actually applied to other
mt76 drivers calling mt76_dma_cleanup() during removal. Tx napi is enabled
in their *_dma_init() functions and only toggled off and on again inside
their suspend/resume/reset paths. So it should be okay to disable tx
napi in such a generic way.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org).

Fixes: 2ac515a ("mt76: mt76x02: use napi polling for tx cleanup")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Fedor Pchelkin <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Ming Yen Hsieh <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Felix Fietkau <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 30, 2025
@kuba-moo
bnxt_en: Fix double invocation of bnxt_ulp_stop()/bnxt_ulp_start()
1e9ac33 
Before the commit under the Fixes tag below, bnxt_ulp_stop() and
bnxt_ulp_start() were always invoked in pairs.  After that commit,
the new bnxt_ulp_restart() can be invoked after bnxt_ulp_stop()
has been called.  This may result in the RoCE driver's aux driver
.suspend() method being invoked twice.  The 2nd bnxt_re_suspend()
call will crash when it dereferences a NULL pointer:

(NULL ib_device): Handle device suspend call
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000b78
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 181 Comm: kworker/u96:5 Tainted: G S                  6.15.0-rc1 #4 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC
Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R730/072T6D, BIOS 2.4.3 01/17/2017
Workqueue: bnxt_pf_wq bnxt_sp_task [bnxt_en]
RIP: 0010:bnxt_re_suspend+0x45/0x1f0 [bnxt_re]
Code: 8b 05 a7 3c 5b f5 48 89 44 24 18 31 c0 49 8b 5c 24 08 4d 8b 2c 24 e8 ea 06 0a f4 48 c7 c6 04 60 52 c0 48 89 df e8 1b ce f9 ff <48> 8b 83 78 0b 00 00 48 8b 80 38 03 00 00 a8 40 0f 85 b5 00 00 00
RSP: 0018:ffffa2e84084fd88 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffffb4b6b934 RDI: 00000000ffffffff
RBP: ffffa1760954c9c0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffffdfff
R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffa2e84084fb50 R12: ffffa176031ef070
R13: ffffa17609775000 R14: ffffa17603adc180 R15: 0000000000000000
FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa17daa397000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000b78 CR3: 00000004aaa30003 CR4: 00000000003706f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
<TASK>
bnxt_ulp_stop+0x69/0x90 [bnxt_en]
bnxt_sp_task+0x678/0x920 [bnxt_en]
? __schedule+0x514/0xf50
process_scheduled_works+0x9d/0x400
worker_thread+0x11c/0x260
? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0xfe/0x1e0
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork+0x2b/0x40
? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

Check the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED flag and do not proceed if the flag
is already set.  This will preserve the original symmetrical
bnxt_ulp_stop() and bnxt_ulp_start().

Also, inside bnxt_ulp_start(), clear the BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED
flag after taking the mutex to avoid any race condition.  And for
symmetry, only proceed in bnxt_ulp_start() if the
BNXT_EN_FLAG_ULP_STOPPED is set.

Fixes: 3c163f3 ("bnxt_en: Optimize recovery path ULP locking in the driver")
Signed-off-by: Kalesh AP <[email protected]>
Co-developed-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Michael Chan <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 9, 2025
@sudeep-holla
firmware: arm_ffa: Replace mutex with rwlock to avoid sleep in atomic…
9ca7a42 
… context

The current use of a mutex to protect the notifier hashtable accesses
can lead to issues in the atomic context. It results in the below
kernel warnings:

  |  BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at kernel/locking/mutex.c:258
  |  in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 1, non_block: 0, pid: 9, name: kworker/0:0
  |  preempt_count: 1, expected: 0
  |  RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
  |  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 6.14.0 #4
  |  Workqueue: ffa_pcpu_irq_notification notif_pcpu_irq_work_fn
  |  Call trace:
  |   show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C)
  |   dump_stack_lvl+0x78/0x90
  |   dump_stack+0x18/0x24
  |   __might_resched+0x114/0x170
  |   __might_sleep+0x48/0x98
  |   mutex_lock+0x24/0x80
  |   handle_notif_callbacks+0x54/0xe0
  |   notif_get_and_handle+0x40/0x88
  |   generic_exec_single+0x80/0xc0
  |   smp_call_function_single+0xfc/0x1a0
  |   notif_pcpu_irq_work_fn+0x2c/0x38
  |   process_one_work+0x14c/0x2b4
  |   worker_thread+0x2e4/0x3e0
  |   kthread+0x13c/0x210
  |   ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

To address this, replace the mutex with an rwlock to protect the notifier
hashtable accesses. This ensures that read-side locking does not sleep and
multiple readers can acquire the lock concurrently, avoiding unnecessary
contention and potential deadlocks. Writer access remains exclusive,
preserving correctness.

This change resolves warnings from lockdep about potential sleep in
atomic context.

Cc: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Reported-by: Jérôme Forissier <[email protected]>
Closes: OP-TEE/optee_os#7394
Fixes: e057344 ("firmware: arm_ffa: Add interfaces to request notification callbacks")
Message-Id: <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Tested-by: Jens Wiklander <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe added a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 11, 2025
@jgunthorpe
iommu: Compute iommu_groups properly for PCIe switches
94c0c96 
The current algorithm does not work if ACS is turned off, and it is not
clear how this has been missed for so long. Alex suspects a multi-function
modeling of the DSPs may have hidden it, but I could not find a switch
using that scheme.

Most likely people were simply happy they had smaller groups oblivious to
the security problems.

For discussion lets consider a simple topology like the below:

                               -- DSP 02:00.0 -> End Point A
 Root 00:00.0 -> USP 01:00.0 --|
                               -- DSP 02:03.0 -> End Point B

If ACS is fully activated we expect 00:00.0, 01:00.0, 02:00.0, 02:03.0, A,
B to all have unique single device groups.

If both DSPs have ACS off then we expect 00:00.0 and 01:00.0 to have
unique single device groups while 02:00.0, 02:03.0, A, B are part of one
multi-device group.

If the DSPs have asymmetric ACS, with one fully isolating and one
non-isolating we also expect the above multi-device group result.

Instead the current algorithm always creates unique single device groups
for this topology. It happens because the pci_device_group(DSP)
immediately moves to the USP and computes pci_acs_path_enabled(USP) ==
true and decides the DSP can get a unique group. The pci_device_group(A)
immediately moves to the DSP, sees pci_acs_path_enabled(DSP) == false and
then takes the DSPs group.

The current algorithm has several issues:

 1) It implicitly depends on ordering. Since the existing group discovery
    only goes in the upstream direction discovering a downstream device
    before its upstream will cause the wrong creation of narrower groups.

 2) It assumes that if the path from the end point to the root is entirely
    ACS isolated then that end point is isolated. This misses cross-traffic
    in the asymmetric ACS case.

 3) When evaluating a non-isolated DSP it does not check peer DSPs for an
    already established group unless the multi-function feature does it.

 4) It does not understand the aliasing rule for PCIe to PCI bridges
    where the alias is to the subordinate bus. The bridge's RID on the
    primary bus is not aliased. This causes the PCIe to PCI bridge to be
    wrongly joined to the group with the downstream devices.

As grouping is a security property for VFIO creating incorrectly narrowed
groups is a security problem for the system.

Revise the design to solve these problems.

Explicitly require ordering, or return EPROBE_DEFER if things are out of
order. This avoids silent errors that created smaller groups and solves
problem #1.

Work on busses, not devices. Isolation is a property of the bus, and the
first non-isolated bus should form a group containing all devices
downstream of that bus. If all busses on the path to an end device are
isolated then the end device has a chance to make a single-device group.

Use pci_bus_isolation() to compute the bus's isolation status based on the
ACS flags and technology. pci_bus_isolation() touches a lot of PCI
internals to get the information in the right format.

Add a new flag in the iommu_group to record that the group contains a
non-isolated bus. Any downstream pci_device_group() will see
bus->self->iommu_group is non-isolated and unconditionally join it. This
makes the first non-isolation apply to all downstream devices and solves
problem #2

The bus's non-isolated iommu_group will be stored in either the DSP of
PCIe switch or the bus->self upstream device, depending on the situation.
When storing in the DSP all the DSPs are checked first for a pre-existing
non-isolated iommu_group. When stored in the upstream the flag forces it
to all downstreams. This solves problem #3.

Put the handling of end-device aliases and MFD into pci_get_alias_group()
and only call it in cases where we have a fully isolated path. Otherwise
every downstream device on the bus is going to be joined to the group of
bus->self.

Finally, replace the initial pci_for_each_dma_alias() with a combination
of:

 - Directly checking pci_real_dma_dev() and enforcing ordering.
   The group should contain both pdev and pci_real_dma_dev(pdev) which is
   only possible if pdev is ordered after real_dma_dev. This solves a case
   of #1.

 - Indirectly relying on pci_bus_isolation() to report legacy PCI busses
   as non-isolated, with the enum including the distinction of the PCIe to
   PCI bridge being isolated from the downstream. This solves problem #4.

It is very likely this is going to expand iommu_group membership in
existing systems. After all that is the security bug that is being
fixed. Expanding the iommu_groups risks problems for users using VFIO.

The intention is to have a more accurate reflection of the security
properties in the system and should be seen as a security fix. However
people who have ACS disabled may now need to enable it. As such users may
have had good reason for ACS to be disabled I strongly recommend that
backporting of this also include the new config_acs option so that such
users can potentially minimally enable ACS only where needed.

Fixes: 104a1c1 ("iommu/core: Create central IOMMU group lookup/creation interface")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 14, 2025
@bonzini
Merge tag 'kvmarm-fixes-6.16-4' of https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/lin…
8aed168 
…ux/kernel/git/kvmarm/kvmarm into HEAD

KVM/arm64 fixes for 6.16, take #4

- Gracefully fail initialising pKVM if the interrupt controller isn't
  GICv3

- Also gracefully fail initialising pKVM if the carveout allocation
  fails

- Fix the computing of the minimum MMIO range required for the host on
  stage-2 fault

- Fix the generation of the GICv3 Maintenance Interrupt in nested mode
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 21, 2025
@D-Wythe @kuba-moo
net/smc: fix UAF on smcsk after smc_listen_out()
d9cef55 
BPF CI testing report a UAF issue:

  [   16.446633] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000003  0
  [   16.447134] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mod  e
  [   16.447516] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present pag  e
  [   16.447878] PGD 0 P4D   0
  [   16.448063] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPT  I
  [   16.448409] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 9 Comm: kworker/0:1 Tainted: G           OE      6.13.0-rc3-g89e8a75fda73-dirty #4  2
  [   16.449124] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODUL  E
  [   16.449502] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/201  4
  [   16.450201] Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_wor  k
  [   16.450531] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159  0
  [   16.452158] RSP: 0018:ffffb5ab40053d98 EFLAGS: 0001024  6
  [   16.452526] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 000000000000030  0
  [   16.452994] RDX: 0000000000000280 RSI: 00003513840053f0 RDI: 000000000000000  0
  [   16.453492] RBP: ffffa097808e3800 R08: ffffa09782dba1e0 R09: 000000000000000  5
  [   16.453987] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffffa0978274640  0
  [   16.454497] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffffa09782d4092  0
  [   16.454996] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffffa097bbc00000(0000) knlGS:000000000000000  0
  [   16.455557] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 000000008005003  3
  [   16.455961] CR2: 0000000000000030 CR3: 0000000102788004 CR4: 0000000000770ef  0
  [   16.456459] PKRU: 5555555  4
  [   16.456654] Call Trace  :
  [   16.456832]  <TASK  >
  [   16.456989]  ? __die+0x23/0x7  0
  [   16.457215]  ? page_fault_oops+0x180/0x4c  0
  [   16.457508]  ? __lock_acquire+0x3e6/0x249  0
  [   16.457801]  ? exc_page_fault+0x68/0x20  0
  [   16.458080]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x3  0
  [   16.458389]  ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159  0
  [   16.458689]  ? smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x159  0
  [   16.458987]  ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x10  0
  [   16.459284]  process_one_work+0x1ea/0x6d  0
  [   16.459570]  worker_thread+0x1c3/0x38  0
  [   16.459839]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x1  0
  [   16.460144]  kthread+0xe0/0x11  0
  [   16.460372]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1  0
  [   16.460640]  ret_from_fork+0x31/0x5  0
  [   16.460896]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x1  0
  [   16.461166]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x3  0
  [   16.461453]  </TASK  >
  [   16.461616] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) [last unloaded: bpf_testmod(OE)  ]
  [   16.462134] CR2: 000000000000003  0
  [   16.462380] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
  [   16.462710] RIP: 0010:smc_listen_work+0xc02/0x1590

The direct cause of this issue is that after smc_listen_out_connected(),
newclcsock->sk may be NULL since it will releases the smcsk. Therefore,
if the application closes the socket immediately after accept,
newclcsock->sk can be NULL. A possible execution order could be as
follows:

smc_listen_work                                 | userspace
-----------------------------------------------------------------
lock_sock(sk)                                   |
smc_listen_out_connected()                      |
| \- smc_listen_out                             |
|    | \- release_sock                          |
     | |- sk->sk_data_ready()                   |
                                                | fd = accept();
                                                | close(fd);
                                                |  \- socket->sk = NULL;
/* newclcsock->sk is NULL now */
SMC_STAT_SERV_SUCC_INC(sock_net(newclcsock->sk))

Since smc_listen_out_connected() will not fail, simply swapping the order
of the code can easily fix this issue.

Fixes: 3b2dec2 ("net/smc: restructure client and server code in af_smc")
Signed-off-by: D. Wythe <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Guangguan Wang <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Alexandra Winter <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Dust Li <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 4, 2025
@jmberg-intel @rafaeljw
PM: sleep: annotate RCU list iterations
e246518 
These iterations require the read lock, otherwise RCU
lockdep will splat:

=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
6.17.0-rc3-00014-g31419c045d64 torvalds#6 Tainted: G           O
-----------------------------
drivers/base/power/main.c:1333 RCU-list traversed in non-reader section!!

other info that might help us debug this:

rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
5 locks held by rtcwake/547:
 #0: 00000000643ab418 (sb_writers#6){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: file_start_write+0x2b/0x3a
 #1: 0000000067a0ca88 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x181/0x24b
 #2: 00000000631eac40 (kn->active#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x191/0x24b
 #3: 00000000609a1308 (system_transition_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: pm_suspend+0xaf/0x30b
 #4: 0000000060c0fdb0 (device_links_srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: device_links_read_lock+0x75/0x98

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 547 Comm: rtcwake Tainted: G           O        6.17.0-rc3-00014-g31419c045d64 torvalds#6 VOLUNTARY
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
Stack:
 223721b3a80 6089eac6 00000001 00000001
 ffffff00 6089eac6 00000535 6086e528
 721b3ac0 6003c294 00000000 60031fc0
Call Trace:
 [<600407ed>] show_stack+0x10e/0x127
 [<6003c294>] dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xc6
 [<6003c2fd>] dump_stack+0x1a/0x20
 [<600bc2f8>] lockdep_rcu_suspicious+0x116/0x13e
 [<603d8ea1>] dpm_async_suspend_superior+0x117/0x17e
 [<603d980f>] device_suspend+0x528/0x541
 [<603da24b>] dpm_suspend+0x1a2/0x267
 [<603da837>] dpm_suspend_start+0x5d/0x72
 [<600ca0c9>] suspend_devices_and_enter+0xab/0x736
 [...]

Add the fourth argument to the iteration to annotate
this and avoid the splat.

Fixes: 0679963 ("PM: sleep: Make async suspend handle suppliers like parents")
Fixes: ed18738 ("PM: sleep: Make async resume handle consumers like children")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250826134348.aba79f6e6299.I9ecf55da46ccf33778f2c018a82e1819d815b348@changeid
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe added a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 5, 2025
@jgunthorpe
iommu: Compute iommu_groups properly for PCIe switches
367ef46 
The current algorithm does not work if ACS is turned off, and it is not
clear how this has been missed for so long. I think it has been avoided
because the kernel command line options to target specific devices and
disable ACS are rarely used.

For discussion lets consider a simple topology like the below:

                               -- DSP 02:00.0 -> End Point A
 Root 00:00.0 -> USP 01:00.0 --|
                               -- DSP 02:03.0 -> End Point B

If ACS is fully activated we expect 00:00.0, 01:00.0, 02:00.0, 02:03.0, A,
B to all have unique single device groups.

If both DSPs have ACS off then we expect 00:00.0 and 01:00.0 to have
unique single device groups while 02:00.0, 02:03.0, A, B are part of one
multi-device group.

If the DSPs have asymmetric ACS, with one fully isolating and one
non-isolating we also expect the above multi-device group result.

Instead the current algorithm always creates unique single device groups
for this topology. It happens because the pci_device_group(DSP)
immediately moves to the USP and computes pci_acs_path_enabled(USP) ==
true and decides the DSP can get a unique group. The pci_device_group(A)
immediately moves to the DSP, sees pci_acs_path_enabled(DSP) == false and
then takes the DSPs group.

For root-ports a PCIe topology like:
                                         -- Dev 01:00.0
  Root  00:00.00 --- Root Port 00:01.0 --|
                  |                      -- Dev 01:00.1
		  |- Dev 00:17.0

Previously would group [00:01.0, 01:00.0, 01:00.1] together if there is no
ACS capability in the root port.

While ACS on root ports is underspecified in the spec, it should still
function as an egress control and limit access to either the MMIO of the
root port itself, or perhaps some other devices upstream of the root
complex - 00:17.0 perhaps in this example.

Historically the grouping in Linux has assumed the root port routes all
traffic into the TA/IOMMU and never bypasses the TA to go to other
functions in the root complex. Following the new understanding that ACS is
required for internal loopback also treat root ports with no ACS
capability as lacking internal loopback as well.

The current algorithm has several issues:

 1) It implicitly depends on ordering. Since the existing group discovery
    only goes in the upstream direction discovering a downstream device
    before its upstream will cause the wrong creation of narrower groups.

 2) It assumes that if the path from the end point to the root is entirely
    ACS isolated then that end point is isolated. This misses cross-traffic
    in the asymmetric ACS case.

 3) When evaluating a non-isolated DSP it does not check peer DSPs for an
    already established group unless the multi-function feature does it.

 4) It does not understand the aliasing rule for PCIe to PCI bridges
    where the alias is to the subordinate bus. The bridge's RID on the
    primary bus is not aliased. This causes the PCIe to PCI bridge to be
    wrongly joined to the group with the downstream devices.

As grouping is a security property for VFIO creating incorrectly narrowed
groups is a security problem for the system.

Revise the design to solve these problems.

Explicitly require ordering, or return EPROBE_DEFER if things are out of
order. This avoids silent errors that created smaller groups and solves
problem #1.

Work on busses, not devices. Isolation is a property of the bus, and the
first non-isolated bus should form a group containing all devices
downstream of that bus. If all busses on the path to an end device are
isolated then the end device has a chance to make a single-device group.

Use pci_bus_isolation() to compute the bus's isolation status based on the
ACS flags and technology. pci_bus_isolation() touches a lot of PCI
internals to get the information in the right format.

Add a new flag in the iommu_group to record that the group contains a
non-isolated bus. Any downstream pci_device_group() will see
bus->self->iommu_group is non-isolated and unconditionally join it. This
makes the first non-isolation apply to all downstream devices and solves
problem #2

The bus's non-isolated iommu_group will be stored in either the DSP of
PCIe switch or the bus->self upstream device, depending on the situation.
When storing in the DSP all the DSPs are checked first for a pre-existing
non-isolated iommu_group. When stored in the upstream the flag forces it
to all downstreams. This solves problem #3.

Put the handling of end-device aliases and MFD into pci_get_alias_group()
and only call it in cases where we have a fully isolated path. Otherwise
every downstream device on the bus is going to be joined to the group of
bus->self.

Finally, replace the initial pci_for_each_dma_alias() with a combination
of:

 - Directly checking pci_real_dma_dev() and enforcing ordering.
   The group should contain both pdev and pci_real_dma_dev(pdev) which is
   only possible if pdev is ordered after real_dma_dev. This solves a case
   of #1.

 - Indirectly relying on pci_bus_isolation() to report legacy PCI busses
   as non-isolated, with the enum including the distinction of the PCIe to
   PCI bridge being isolated from the downstream. This solves problem #4.

It is very likely this is going to expand iommu_group membership in
existing systems. After all that is the security bug that is being
fixed. Expanding the iommu_groups risks problems for users using VFIO.

The intention is to have a more accurate reflection of the security
properties in the system and should be seen as a security fix. However
people who have ACS disabled may now need to enable it. As such users may
have had good reason for ACS to be disabled I strongly recommend that
backporting of this also include the new config_acs option so that such
users can potentially minimally enable ACS only where needed.

Fixes: 104a1c1 ("iommu/core: Create central IOMMU group lookup/creation interface")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe added a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 9, 2025
@jgunthorpe
iommu: Compute iommu_groups properly for PCIe switches
860da7a 
The current algorithm does not work if ACS is turned off, and it is not
clear how this has been missed for so long. I think it has been avoided
because the kernel command line options to target specific devices and
disable ACS are rarely used.

For discussion lets consider a simple topology like the below:

                               -- DSP 02:00.0 -> End Point A
 Root 00:00.0 -> USP 01:00.0 --|
                               -- DSP 02:03.0 -> End Point B

If ACS is fully activated we expect 00:00.0, 01:00.0, 02:00.0, 02:03.0, A,
B to all have unique single device groups.

If both DSPs have ACS off then we expect 00:00.0 and 01:00.0 to have
unique single device groups while 02:00.0, 02:03.0, A, B are part of one
multi-device group.

If the DSPs have asymmetric ACS, with one fully isolating and one
non-isolating we also expect the above multi-device group result.

Instead the current algorithm always creates unique single device groups
for this topology. It happens because the pci_device_group(DSP)
immediately moves to the USP and computes pci_acs_path_enabled(USP) ==
true and decides the DSP can get a unique group. The pci_device_group(A)
immediately moves to the DSP, sees pci_acs_path_enabled(DSP) == false and
then takes the DSPs group.

For root-ports a PCIe topology like:
                                         -- Dev 01:00.0
  Root  00:00.00 --- Root Port 00:01.0 --|
                  |                      -- Dev 01:00.1
		  |- Dev 00:17.0

Previously would group [00:01.0, 01:00.0, 01:00.1] together if there is no
ACS capability in the root port.

While ACS on root ports is underspecified in the spec, it should still
function as an egress control and limit access to either the MMIO of the
root port itself, or perhaps some other devices upstream of the root
complex - 00:17.0 perhaps in this example.

Historically the grouping in Linux has assumed the root port routes all
traffic into the TA/IOMMU and never bypasses the TA to go to other
functions in the root complex. Following the new understanding that ACS is
required for internal loopback also treat root ports with no ACS
capability as lacking internal loopback as well.

The current algorithm has several issues:

 1) It implicitly depends on ordering. Since the existing group discovery
    only goes in the upstream direction discovering a downstream device
    before its upstream will cause the wrong creation of narrower groups.

 2) It assumes that if the path from the end point to the root is entirely
    ACS isolated then that end point is isolated. This misses cross-traffic
    in the asymmetric ACS case.

 3) When evaluating a non-isolated DSP it does not check peer DSPs for an
    already established group unless the multi-function feature does it.

 4) It does not understand the aliasing rule for PCIe to PCI bridges
    where the alias is to the subordinate bus. The bridge's RID on the
    primary bus is not aliased. This causes the PCIe to PCI bridge to be
    wrongly joined to the group with the downstream devices.

As grouping is a security property for VFIO creating incorrectly narrowed
groups is a security problem for the system.

Revise the design to solve these problems.

Explicitly require ordering, or return EPROBE_DEFER if things are out of
order. This avoids silent errors that created smaller groups and solves
problem #1.

Work on busses, not devices. Isolation is a property of the bus, and the
first non-isolated bus should form a group containing all devices
downstream of that bus. If all busses on the path to an end device are
isolated then the end device has a chance to make a single-device group.

Use pci_bus_isolation() to compute the bus's isolation status based on the
ACS flags and technology. pci_bus_isolation() touches a lot of PCI
internals to get the information in the right format.

Add a new flag in the iommu_group to record that the group contains a
non-isolated bus. Any downstream pci_device_group() will see
bus->self->iommu_group is non-isolated and unconditionally join it. This
makes the first non-isolation apply to all downstream devices and solves
problem #2

The bus's non-isolated iommu_group will be stored in either the DSP of
PCIe switch or the bus->self upstream device, depending on the situation.
When storing in the DSP all the DSPs are checked first for a pre-existing
non-isolated iommu_group. When stored in the upstream the flag forces it
to all downstreams. This solves problem #3.

Put the handling of end-device aliases and MFD into pci_get_alias_group()
and only call it in cases where we have a fully isolated path. Otherwise
every downstream device on the bus is going to be joined to the group of
bus->self.

Finally, replace the initial pci_for_each_dma_alias() with a combination
of:

 - Directly checking pci_real_dma_dev() and enforcing ordering.
   The group should contain both pdev and pci_real_dma_dev(pdev) which is
   only possible if pdev is ordered after real_dma_dev. This solves a case
   of #1.

 - Indirectly relying on pci_bus_isolation() to report legacy PCI busses
   as non-isolated, with the enum including the distinction of the PCIe to
   PCI bridge being isolated from the downstream. This solves problem #4.

It is very likely this is going to expand iommu_group membership in
existing systems. After all that is the security bug that is being
fixed. Expanding the iommu_groups risks problems for users using VFIO.

The intention is to have a more accurate reflection of the security
properties in the system and should be seen as a security fix. However
people who have ACS disabled may now need to enable it. As such users may
have had good reason for ACS to be disabled I strongly recommend that
backporting of this also include the new config_acs option so that such
users can potentially minimally enable ACS only where needed.

Fixes: 104a1c1 ("iommu/core: Create central IOMMU group lookup/creation interface")
Cc: [email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe added a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 15, 2025
@jgunthorpe
iommu: Compute iommu_groups properly for PCIe switches
735e028 
The current algorithm does not work if ACS is turned off, and it is not
clear how this has been missed for so long. I think it has been avoided
because the kernel command line options to target specific devices and
disable ACS are rarely used.

For discussion consider a simple topology like the below:

                               -- DSP 02:00.0 -> End Point A
 Root 00:00.0 -> USP 01:00.0 --|
                               -- DSP 02:03.0 -> End Point B

If ACS is fully activated we expect 00:00.0, 01:00.0, 02:00.0, 02:03.0, A,
B to all have unique single device groups.

If both DSPs have ACS off then we expect 00:00.0 and 01:00.0 to have
unique single device groups while 02:00.0, 02:03.0, A, B are part of one
multi-device group.

If the DSPs have asymmetric ACS, with one fully isolating and one
non-isolating we also expect the above multi-device group result.

Instead the current algorithm always creates unique single device groups
for this topology. It happens because the pci_device_group(DSP)
immediately moves to the USP and computes pci_acs_path_enabled(USP) ==
true and decides the DSP can get a unique group. The pci_device_group(A)
immediately moves to the DSP, sees pci_acs_path_enabled(DSP) == false and
then takes the DSP's group.

For Root Ports a PCIe topology like:
                                         -- Dev 01:00.0
  Root  00:00.00 --- Root Port 00:01.0 --|
                  |                      -- Dev 01:00.1
		  |- Dev 00:17.0

Previously would group [00:01.0, 01:00.0, 01:00.1] together if there is no
ACS capability in the Root Port.

While ACS on Root Ports is underspecified in the spec, it should still
function as an egress control and limit access to either the BARs of the
Root Port itself, or perhaps some other devices upstream of the Root
Complex - 00:17.0 perhaps in this example.

Historically the grouping in Linux has assumed the Root Port routes all
traffic into the TA/IOMMU and never bypasses the TA to go to other
functions in the Root Complex. Following the new understanding that ACS is
required for internal loopback also treat Root Ports with no ACS
capability as lacking internal loopback as well.

The current algorithm has several issues:

 1) It implicitly depends on ordering. Since the existing group discovery
    only goes in the upstream direction discovering a downstream device
    before its upstream will cause the wrong creation of narrower groups.

 2) It assumes that if the path from the end point to the root is entirely
    ACS isolated then that end point is isolated. This misses cross-traffic
    in the asymmetric ACS case.

 3) When evaluating a non-isolated DSP it does not check peer DSPs for an
    already established group unless the multi-function feature does it.

 4) It does not understand the aliasing rule for PCIe to PCI bridges
    where the alias is to the subordinate bus. The bridge's RID on the
    primary bus is not aliased. This causes the PCIe to PCI bridge to be
    wrongly joined to the group with the downstream devices.

As grouping is a security property for VFIO creating less isolated group
with fewer devices is a security problem for the system.

Revise the design to solve these problems.

Explicitly require probing upstream devices before downstream edvices, or
return EPROBE_DEFER if things are out of order. This avoids silent errors
that created smaller groups and solves problem #1.

Work on buses, not devices. Isolation is a property of the bus, and the
first non-isolated bus should form a group containing all devices
downstream of that bus. If all buses on the path to an end device are
isolated then the end device has a chance to make a single-device group.

Use pci_bus_isolation() to compute the bus's isolation status based on the
ACS flags and technology. pci_bus_isolation() touches a lot of PCI
internals to get the information in the right format.

Add a new flag in the iommu_group to record that the group contains a
non-isolated bus. Any downstream pci_device_group() will see
bus->self->iommu_group is non-isolated and unconditionally join it. This
makes the first non-isolation apply to all downstream devices and solves
problem #2

The bus's non-isolated iommu_group will be stored in either the DSP of
PCIe switch or the bus->self upstream device, depending on the situation.
When storing in the DSP all the DSPs are checked first for a pre-existing
non-isolated iommu_group. When stored in the upstream the flag forces it
to all downstreams. This solves problem #3.

Put the handling of end-device aliases and MFD into pci_get_alias_group()
and only call it in cases where we have a fully isolated path. Otherwise
every downstream device on the bus is going to be joined to the group of
bus->self.

Finally, replace the initial pci_for_each_dma_alias() with a combination
of:

 - Directly checking pci_real_dma_dev() and enforcing ordering.
   The group should contain both pdev and pci_real_dma_dev(pdev) which is
   only possible if pdev is ordered after real_dma_dev. This solves a case
   of #1.

 - Indirectly relying on pci_bus_isolation() to report legacy PCI buses
   as non-isolated, with the enum including the distinction of the PCIe to
   PCI bridge being isolated from the downstream. This solves problem #4.

It is very likely this is going to expand iommu_group membership in
existing systems. After all that is the security bug that is being
fixed. Expanding the iommu_groups risks problems for users using VFIO.

The intention is to have a more accurate reflection of the security
properties in the system and should be seen as a security fix. However
people who have ACS disabled may now need to enable it. As such users may
have had good reason for ACS to be disabled I strongly recommend that
backporting of this also include the new config_acs option so that such
users can potentially minimally enable ACS only where needed.

Fixes: 104a1c1 ("iommu/core: Create central IOMMU group lookup/creation interface")
Cc: [email protected]
Reviewed-by: Donald Dutile <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 20, 2025
@kuba-moo
net: core: fix lockdep splat on device unregister
7f0fddd 
Since blamed commit, unregister_netdevice_many_notify() takes the netdev
mutex if the device needs it.

If the device list is too long, this will lock more device mutexes than
lockdep can handle:

unshare -n \
 bash -c 'for i in $(seq 1 100);do ip link add foo$i type dummy;done'

BUG: MAX_LOCK_DEPTH too low!
turning off the locking correctness validator.
depth: 48  max: 48!
48 locks held by kworker/u16:1/69:
 #0: ..148 ((wq_completion)netns){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #1: ..d40 (net_cleanup_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_one_work
 #2: ..bd0 (pernet_ops_rwsem){++++}-{4:4}, at: cleanup_net
 #3: ..aa8 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: default_device_exit_batch
 #4: ..cb0 (&dev_instance_lock_key#3){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: unregister_netdevice_many_notify
[..]

Add a helper to close and then unlock a list of net_devices.
Devices that are not up have to be skipped - netif_close_many always
removes them from the list without any other actions taken, so they'd
remain in locked state.

Close devices whenever we've used up half of the tracking slots or we
processed entire list without hitting the limit.

Fixes: 7e4d784 ("net: hold netdev instance lock during rtnetlink operations")
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <[email protected]>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 3, 2025
@gregkh
devcoredump: Fix circular locking dependency with devcd->mutex.
a91c809 
The original code causes a circular locking dependency found by lockdep.

======================================================
WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 Tainted: G S   U
------------------------------------------------------
xe_fault_inject/5091 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff888156815688 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: __flush_work+0x25d/0x660

but task is already holding lock:

ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0
which lock already depends on the new lock.
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
-> #2 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
       mutex_lock_nested+0x4e/0xc0
       devcd_data_write+0x27/0x90
       sysfs_kf_bin_write+0x80/0xf0
       kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220
       vfs_write+0x293/0x560
       ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
       __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30
       x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660
       do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
-> #1 (kn->active#236){++++}-{0:0}:
       kernfs_drain+0x1e2/0x200
       __kernfs_remove+0xae/0x400
       kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0x5d/0xc0
       remove_files+0x54/0x70
       sysfs_remove_group+0x3d/0xa0
       sysfs_remove_groups+0x2e/0x60
       device_remove_attrs+0xc7/0x100
       device_del+0x15d/0x3b0
       devcd_del+0x19/0x30
       process_one_work+0x22b/0x6f0
       worker_thread+0x1e8/0x3d0
       kthread+0x11c/0x250
       ret_from_fork+0x26c/0x2e0
       ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
-> #0 ((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}:
       __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860
       lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0
       __flush_work+0x27a/0x660
       flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0
       dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0
       xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe]
       devm_action_release+0x12/0x30
       release_nodes+0x3a/0x120
       devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0
       device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80
       device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280
       device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20
       unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0
       drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50
       sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80
       kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220
       vfs_write+0x293/0x560
       ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
       __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30
       x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660
       do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60
       entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
other info that might help us debug this:
Chain exists of: (work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work) --> kn->active#236 --> &devcd->mutex
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:
       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(&devcd->mutex);
                               lock(kn->active#236);
                               lock(&devcd->mutex);
  lock((work_completion)(&(&devcd->del_wk)->work));
 *** DEADLOCK ***
5 locks held by xe_fault_inject/5091:
 #0: ffff8881129f9488 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
 #1: ffff88810c755078 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x123/0x220
 #2: ffff8881054811a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: device_release_driver_internal+0x55/0x280
 #3: ffff888156815620 (&devcd->mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dev_coredump_put+0x3f/0xa0
 #4: ffffffff8359e020 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __flush_work+0x72/0x660
stack backtrace:
CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 5091 Comm: xe_fault_inject Tainted: G S   U              6.16.0-rc6-lgci-xe-xe-pw-151626v3+ #1 PREEMPT_{RT,(lazy)}
Tainted: [S]=CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC, [U]=USER
Hardware name: Micro-Star International Co., Ltd. MS-7D25/PRO Z690-A DDR4(MS-7D25), BIOS 1.10 12/13/2021
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0
 dump_stack+0x10/0x20
 print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360
 check_noncircular+0x135/0x150
 ? register_lock_class+0x48/0x4a0
 __lock_acquire+0x1661/0x2860
 lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0
 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660
 ? mark_held_locks+0x46/0x90
 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660
 __flush_work+0x27a/0x660
 ? __flush_work+0x25d/0x660
 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x1e/0xd0
 ? __pfx_wq_barrier_func+0x10/0x10
 flush_delayed_work+0x5d/0xa0
 dev_coredump_put+0x63/0xa0
 xe_driver_devcoredump_fini+0x12/0x20 [xe]
 devm_action_release+0x12/0x30
 release_nodes+0x3a/0x120
 devres_release_all+0x8a/0xd0
 device_unbind_cleanup+0x12/0x80
 device_release_driver_internal+0x23a/0x280
 ? bus_find_device+0xa8/0xe0
 device_driver_detach+0x14/0x20
 unbind_store+0xaf/0xc0
 drv_attr_store+0x21/0x50
 sysfs_kf_write+0x4a/0x80
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x169/0x220
 vfs_write+0x293/0x560
 ksys_write+0x72/0xf0
 __x64_sys_write+0x19/0x30
 x64_sys_call+0x2bf/0x2660
 do_syscall_64+0x93/0xb60
 ? __f_unlock_pos+0x15/0x20
 ? __x64_sys_getdents64+0x9b/0x130
 ? __pfx_filldir64+0x10/0x10
 ? do_syscall_64+0x1a2/0xb60
 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80
 ? clear_bhb_loop+0x30/0x80
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
RIP: 0033:0x76e292edd574
Code: c7 00 16 00 00 00 b8 ff ff ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 f3 0f 1e fa 80 3d d5 ea 0e 00 00 74 13 b8 01 00 00 00 0f 05 <48> 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 54 c3 0f 1f 00 55 48 89 e5 48 83 ec 20 48 89
RSP: 002b:00007fffe247a828 EFLAGS: 00000202 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 000076e292edd574
RDX: 000000000000000c RSI: 00006267f6306063 RDI: 000000000000000b
RBP: 000000000000000c R08: 000076e292fc4b20 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000202 R12: 00006267f6306063
R13: 000000000000000b R14: 00006267e6859c00 R15: 000076e29322a000
 </TASK>
xe 0000:03:00.0: [drm] Xe device coredump has been deleted.

Fixes: 01daccf ("devcoredump : Serialize devcd_del work")
Cc: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
Cc: Johannes Berg <[email protected]>
Cc: Rafael J. Wysocki <[email protected]>
Cc: Danilo Krummrich <[email protected]>
Cc: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected] # v6.1+
Signed-off-by: Maarten Lankhorst <[email protected]>
Cc: Matthew Brost <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Mukesh Ojha <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 3, 2025
@kdave
btrfs: directly free partially initialized fs_info in btrfs_check_lea…
17679ac 
…ked_roots()

If fs_info->super_copy or fs_info->super_for_commit allocated failed in
btrfs_get_tree_subvol(), then no need to call btrfs_free_fs_info().
Otherwise btrfs_check_leaked_roots() would access NULL pointer because
fs_info->allocated_roots had not been initialised.

syzkaller reported the following information:
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: fffffffffffffbb0
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 64c9067 P4D 64c9067 PUD 64cb067 PMD 0
  Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1402 Comm: syz.1.35 Not tainted 6.15.8 #4 PREEMPT(lazy)
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), (...)
  RIP: 0010:arch_atomic_read arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:23 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:raw_atomic_read include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:457 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:atomic_read include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:33 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:refcount_read include/linux/refcount.h:170 [inline]
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_check_leaked_roots+0x18f/0x2c0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1230
  [...]
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   btrfs_free_fs_info+0x310/0x410 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:1280
   btrfs_get_tree_subvol+0x592/0x6b0 fs/btrfs/super.c:2029
   btrfs_get_tree+0x63/0x80 fs/btrfs/super.c:2097
   vfs_get_tree+0x98/0x320 fs/super.c:1759
   do_new_mount+0x357/0x660 fs/namespace.c:3899
   path_mount+0x716/0x19c0 fs/namespace.c:4226
   do_mount fs/namespace.c:4239 [inline]
   __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4450 [inline]
   __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4427 [inline]
   __x64_sys_mount+0x28c/0x310 fs/namespace.c:4427
   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0x92/0x180 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  RIP: 0033:0x7f032eaffa8d
  [...]

Fixes: 3bb17a2 ("btrfs: add get_tree callback for new mount API")
CC: [email protected] # 6.12+
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vacek <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Dewei Meng <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 7, 2025
@kuba-moo
Merge branch 'bnxt_en-bug-fixes'
a30297d 
Michael Chan says:

====================
bnxt_en: Bug fixes

Patches 1, 3, and 4 are bug fixes related to the FW log tracing driver
coredump feature recently added in 6.13.  Patch #1 adds the necessary
call to shutdown the FW logging DMA during PCI shutdown.  Patch #3 fixes
a possible null pointer derefernce when using early versions of the FW
with this feature.  Patch #4 adds the coredump header information
unconditionally to make it more robust.

Patch #2 fixes a possible memory leak during PTP shutdown.  Patch #5
eliminates a dmesg warning when doing devlink reload.
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/[email protected]
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <[email protected]>
jgunthorpe pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 21, 2025
@jkrzyszt-intel @rodrigovivi
drm/i915: Avoid lock inversion when pinning to GGTT on CHV/BXT+VTD
84bbe32 
On completion of i915_vma_pin_ww(), a synchronous variant of
dma_fence_work_commit() is called.  When pinning a VMA to GGTT address
space on a Cherry View family processor, or on a Broxton generation SoC
with VTD enabled, i.e., when stop_machine() is then called from
intel_ggtt_bind_vma(), that can potentially lead to lock inversion among
reservation_ww and cpu_hotplug locks.

[86.861179] ======================================================
[86.861193] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[86.861209] 6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 Tainted: G     U
[86.861226] ------------------------------------------------------
[86.861238] i915_module_loa/1432 is trying to acquire lock:
[86.861252] ffffffff83489090 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}, at: stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.861290]
but task is already holding lock:
[86.861303] ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.862233]
which lock already depends on the new lock.
[86.862251]
the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[86.862265]
-> #5 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[86.862292]        dma_resv_lockdep+0x19a/0x390
[86.862315]        do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.862334]        kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680
[86.862353]        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
[86.862369]        ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70
[86.862383]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[86.862399]
-> #4 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}:
[86.862425]        dma_resv_lockdep+0x178/0x390
[86.862440]        do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.862454]        kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680
[86.862470]        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
[86.862482]        ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70
[86.862495]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[86.862509]
-> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
[86.862531]        down_read_killable+0x46/0x1e0
[86.862546]        lock_mm_and_find_vma+0xa2/0x280
[86.862561]        do_user_addr_fault+0x266/0x8e0
[86.862578]        exc_page_fault+0x8a/0x2f0
[86.862593]        asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30
[86.862607]        filldir64+0xeb/0x180
[86.862620]        kernfs_fop_readdir+0x118/0x480
[86.862635]        iterate_dir+0xcf/0x2b0
[86.862648]        __x64_sys_getdents64+0x84/0x140
[86.862661]        x64_sys_call+0x1058/0x2660
[86.862675]        do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90
[86.862689]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[86.862703]
-> #2 (&root->kernfs_rwsem){++++}-{3:3}:
[86.862725]        down_write+0x3e/0xf0
[86.862738]        kernfs_add_one+0x30/0x3c0
[86.862751]        kernfs_create_dir_ns+0x53/0xb0
[86.862765]        internal_create_group+0x134/0x4c0
[86.862779]        sysfs_create_group+0x13/0x20
[86.862792]        topology_add_dev+0x1d/0x30
[86.862806]        cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x4b5/0x850
[86.862822]        cpuhp_issue_call+0xbf/0x1f0
[86.862836]        __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x111/0x320
[86.862852]        __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220
[86.862866]        topology_sysfs_init+0x30/0x50
[86.862879]        do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.862893]        kernel_init_freeable+0x3cd/0x680
[86.862908]        kernel_init+0x1b/0x200
[86.862921]        ret_from_fork+0x47/0x70
[86.862934]        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[86.862947]
-> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
[86.862969]        __mutex_lock+0xaa/0xed0
[86.862982]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30
[86.862995]        __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x67/0x320
[86.863012]        __cpuhp_setup_state+0xb0/0x220
[86.863026]        page_alloc_init_cpuhp+0x2d/0x60
[86.863041]        mm_core_init+0x22/0x2d0
[86.863054]        start_kernel+0x576/0xbd0
[86.863068]        x86_64_start_reservations+0x18/0x30
[86.863084]        x86_64_start_kernel+0xbf/0x110
[86.863098]        common_startup_64+0x13e/0x141
[86.863114]
-> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
[86.863135]        __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810
[86.863152]        lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0
[86.863166]        cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100
[86.863180]        stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.863194]        bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915]
[86.863987]        intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915]
[86.864735]        __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915]
[86.865510]        fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915]
[86.866248]        fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915]
[86.866983]        __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915]
[86.867719]        i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915]
[86.868453]        i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915]
[86.869228]        i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.870001]        initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915]
[86.870774]        intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915]
[86.871546]        intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915]
[86.872330]        i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915]
[86.873057]        i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915]
[86.873782]        local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0
[86.873802]        pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260
[86.873817]        really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0
[86.873833]        __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180
[86.873848]        driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0
[86.873862]        __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220
[86.873876]        bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0
[86.873892]        driver_attach+0x1e/0x30
[86.873904]        bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290
[86.873917]        driver_register+0x5e/0x130
[86.873931]        __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90
[86.873945]        i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915]
[86.874678]        i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915]
[86.875347]        do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.875369]        do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0
[86.875385]        load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80
[86.875398]        init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0
[86.875413]        idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330
[86.875426]        __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100
[86.875440]        x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660
[86.875454]        do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90
[86.875470]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[86.875486]
other info that might help us debug this:
[86.875502] Chain exists of:
  cpu_hotplug_lock --> reservation_ww_class_acquire --> reservation_ww_class_mutex
[86.875539]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[86.875552]        CPU0                    CPU1
[86.875563]        ----                    ----
[86.875573]   lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[86.875588]                                lock(reservation_ww_class_acquire);
[86.875606]                                lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[86.875624]   rlock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
[86.875637]
 *** DEADLOCK ***
[86.875650] 3 locks held by i915_module_loa/1432:
[86.875663]  #0: ffff888101f5c1b0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{3:3}, at: __driver_attach+0x104/0x220
[86.875699]  #1: ffffc90002e0b4a0 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.876512]  #2: ffffc90002e0b4c8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x39/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.877305]
stack backtrace:
[86.877326] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1432 Comm: i915_module_loa Tainted: G     U              6.15.0-rc5-CI_DRM_16515-gca0305cadc2d+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[86.877334] Tainted: [U]=USER
[86.877336] Hardware name:  /NUC5CPYB, BIOS PYBSWCEL.86A.0079.2020.0420.1316 04/20/2020
[86.877339] Call Trace:
[86.877344]  <TASK>
[86.877353]  dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0
[86.877364]  dump_stack+0x10/0x20
[86.877369]  print_circular_bug+0x285/0x360
[86.877379]  check_noncircular+0x135/0x150
[86.877390]  __lock_acquire+0x1635/0x2810
[86.877403]  lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2f0
[86.877408]  ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.877422]  ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915]
[86.878173]  cpus_read_lock+0x41/0x100
[86.878182]  ? stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.878191]  ? __pfx_bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__cb+0x10/0x10 [i915]
[86.878916]  stop_machine+0x1c/0x50
[86.878927]  bxt_vtd_ggtt_insert_entries__BKL+0x3b/0x60 [i915]
[86.879652]  intel_ggtt_bind_vma+0x43/0x70 [i915]
[86.880375]  __vma_bind+0x55/0x70 [i915]
[86.881133]  fence_work+0x26/0xa0 [i915]
[86.881851]  fence_notify+0xa1/0x140 [i915]
[86.882566]  __i915_sw_fence_complete+0x8f/0x270 [i915]
[86.883286]  i915_sw_fence_commit+0x39/0x60 [i915]
[86.884003]  i915_vma_pin_ww+0x462/0x1360 [i915]
[86.884756]  ? i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x6c/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.885513]  i915_vma_pin.constprop.0+0x133/0x1d0 [i915]
[86.886281]  initial_plane_vma+0x307/0x840 [i915]
[86.887049]  intel_initial_plane_config+0x33f/0x670 [i915]
[86.887819]  intel_display_driver_probe_nogem+0x1c6/0x260 [i915]
[86.888587]  i915_driver_probe+0x7fa/0xe80 [i915]
[86.889293]  ? mutex_unlock+0x12/0x20
[86.889301]  ? drm_privacy_screen_get+0x171/0x190
[86.889308]  ? acpi_dev_found+0x66/0x80
[86.889321]  i915_pci_probe+0xe6/0x220 [i915]
[86.890038]  local_pci_probe+0x47/0xb0
[86.890049]  pci_device_probe+0xf3/0x260
[86.890058]  really_probe+0xf1/0x3c0
[86.890067]  __driver_probe_device+0x8c/0x180
[86.890072]  driver_probe_device+0x24/0xd0
[86.890078]  __driver_attach+0x10f/0x220
[86.890083]  ? __pfx___driver_attach+0x10/0x10
[86.890088]  bus_for_each_dev+0x7f/0xe0
[86.890097]  driver_attach+0x1e/0x30
[86.890101]  bus_add_driver+0x151/0x290
[86.890107]  driver_register+0x5e/0x130
[86.890113]  __pci_register_driver+0x7d/0x90
[86.890119]  i915_pci_register_driver+0x23/0x30 [i915]
[86.890833]  i915_init+0x37/0x120 [i915]
[86.891482]  ? __pfx_i915_init+0x10/0x10 [i915]
[86.892135]  do_one_initcall+0x60/0x3f0
[86.892145]  ? __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x33f/0x470
[86.892157]  do_init_module+0x97/0x2a0
[86.892164]  load_module+0x2c54/0x2d80
[86.892168]  ? __kernel_read+0x15c/0x300
[86.892185]  ? kernel_read_file+0x2b1/0x320
[86.892195]  init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0
[86.892199]  ? init_module_from_file+0x96/0xe0
[86.892211]  idempotent_init_module+0x117/0x330
[86.892224]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0x77/0x100
[86.892230]  x64_sys_call+0x24de/0x2660
[86.892236]  do_syscall_64+0x91/0xe90
[86.892243]  ? irqentry_exit+0x77/0xb0
[86.892249]  ? sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x57/0xc0
[86.892256]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[86.892261] RIP: 0033:0x7303e1b2725d
[86.892271] Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 8b bb 0d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48
[86.892276] RSP: 002b:00007ffddd1fdb38 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
[86.892281] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00005d771d88fd90 RCX: 00007303e1b2725d
[86.892285] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00005d771d893aa0 RDI: 000000000000000c
[86.892287] RBP: 00007ffddd1fdbf0 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00007ffddd1fdb80
[86.892289] R10: 00007303e1c03b20 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00005d771d893aa0
[86.892292] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00005d771d88f0d0 R15: 00005d771d895710
[86.892304]  </TASK>

Call asynchronous variant of dma_fence_work_commit() in that case.

v3: Provide more verbose in-line comment (Andi),
  - mention target environments in commit message.

Fixes: 7d1c261 ("drm/i915: Take reservation lock around i915_vma_pin.")
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/drm/i915/kernel/-/issues/14985
Cc: Andi Shyti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Janusz Krzysztofik <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Sebastian Brzezinka <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Krzysztof Karas <[email protected]>
Acked-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Andi Shyti <[email protected]>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/[email protected]
(cherry picked from commit 648ef13)
Signed-off-by: Rodrigo Vivi <[email protected]>
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@gospo @davejiang @jgunthorpe @CCX-Stingray