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4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions assets/pubs/pub.bib
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -22,13 +22,13 @@ @misc{kim:atlantis
}

@InProceedings{kim:crossx,
title = {{CROSS-X: Generalized and Stable Cross-Cache Attack on the Linux Kernel (to appear)}},
title = {{CROSS-X: Generalized and Stable Cross-Cache Attack on the Linux Kernel}},
author = {Dongok Kim* and Juhyun Song* and Insu Yun},
crossref = {CCS25}
}

@InProceedings{kim:jenga,
title = {{Windows plays Jenga: Uncovering Design Weaknesses in Windows File System Security (to appear)}},
title = {{Windows plays Jenga: Uncovering Design Weaknesses in Windows File System Security}},
author = {Dong-uk Kim* and JunYoung Park* and Sanghak Oh and Hyoungshick Kim and Insu Yun},
crossref = {CCS25}
}
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2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion content/publication/kim-crossx/cite.bib
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Expand Up @@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ @proceedings{kim:crossx
author = {Dongok Kim and Juhyun Song and Insu Yun},
booktitle = {Proceedings of the 32nd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)},
month = {October},
title = {{CROSS-X: Generalized and Stable Cross-Cache Attack on the Linux Kernel (to appear)}},
title = {{CROSS-X: Generalized and Stable Cross-Cache Attack on the Linux Kernel}},
year = {2025}
}

25 changes: 20 additions & 5 deletions content/publication/kim-crossx/index.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
---
# Documentation: https://wowchemy.com/docs/managing-content/

title: 'CROSS-X: Generalized and Stable Cross-Cache Attack on the Linux Kernel (to
appear)'
title: 'CROSS-X: Generalized and Stable Cross-Cache Attack on the Linux Kernel'
subtitle: ''
summary: ''
authors:
Expand All @@ -12,7 +11,7 @@ authors:
tags: []
categories: []
date: '2025-10-01'
lastmod: 2025-08-21T09:23:27+09:00
lastmod: 2025-12-09T16:36:14+09:00
featured: false
draft: false

Expand All @@ -30,12 +29,28 @@ image:
# E.g. `projects = ["internal-project"]` references `content/project/deep-learning/index.md`.
# Otherwise, set `projects = []`.
projects: []
publishDate: '2025-08-21T00:23:27.274397Z'
publishDate: '2025-12-09T07:36:14.570346Z'
publication_types:
- '0'
abstract: ''
abstract: 'The cross-cache attack is a fundamental component of modern Linux kernel
exploits, spanning real-world attacks and recent research. Despite its importance,
it is often regarded as unreliable due to its complex setup, and existing studies
lack in-depth analysis of its mechanics. In this paper, we address this gap by:
(1) reviewing public strategies and their limitations, (2) proposing two optimized
strategies effective in varied conditions, and (3) introducing CROSS-X, an automated
system that identifies suitable target objects for cross-cache attacks. We evaluated
our strategies on a synthetic vulnerability and nine real-world CVEs, achieving
over 99% and 85% success rates under idle and busy workloads, respectively. They
also outperformed existing methods in 6 of 8 CVEs under idle workloads and 5 of
8 under busy workloads. For object identification, we define three key properties:
(1) spray capability, (2) minimal interference, and (3) useful primitives. Based
on these, CROSS-X identified seven versatile target objects and their relationship
with interfering allocations. We believe our work will enhance public understanding
of cross-cache attacks and contribute to improving Linux kernel security.'
publication: '*Proceedings of the 32nd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS)*'
url_slides: pubs/2025/kim:crossx-slides.pdf
url_paper: pubs/2025/kim:crossx.pdf
author_notes:
- Equal contribution
- Equal contribution
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11 changes: 3 additions & 8 deletions content/publication/kim-jenga/index.md
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Expand Up @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ authors:
tags: []
categories: []
date: '2025-10-01'
lastmod: 2025-12-05T13:31:53+09:00
lastmod: 2025-12-09T16:37:13+09:00
featured: false
draft: false

Expand All @@ -31,18 +31,13 @@ image:
# E.g. `projects = ["internal-project"]` references `content/project/deep-learning/index.md`.
# Otherwise, set `projects = []`.
projects: []
publishDate: '2025-12-05T13:31:53.532613Z'
publishDate: '2025-12-09T07:37:13.640634Z'
publication_types:
- '0'
abstract: "File systems are essential components of modern operating systems, with Windows being one of the most dominant platforms. Recently, a series of attacks have exploited the Windows file system to trigger serious security threats such as privilege escalation. Over the past several years, dozens of such attacks have been reported and even exploited in the wild. However, Microsoft has consistently addressed these issues with targeted patches rather than fundamental redesigns --- resembling a precarious game of Jenga where security measures are stacked upon an unstable foundation.

In this paper, we present a five-step comprehensive analysis of the Windows file system's design weaknesses. First, we analyze how Windows differs from another operating system, Linux. Second, we investigated how these discrepancies lead to security vulnerabilities in real-world applications and identified 13 high-impact vulnerabilities, including 11 previously unknown ones. Third, we show that current compatibility layers in modern programming languages fail to handle these discrepancies properly. Specifically, we examined compatibility layers in six programming languages and found 27 non-compliant and 9 inconsistencies, rendering these layers unreliable. Fourth, through a user study involving 21 experienced developers, we found that most were unfamiliar with OS-level file system discrepancies and rarely implemented appropriate mitigations. Finally, we analyze existing countermeasures and discuss their limitations. Our findings reveal critical yet largely obscured security risks resulting from design flaws in the Windows file system. Furthermore, we suggest that Microsoft rethink its strategy and address these fundamental weaknesses."
abstract: ''
publication: '*Proceedings of the 32nd ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security (CCS)*'
author_notes:
- Equal contribution
- Equal contribution
url_slides: pubs/2025/kim_jenga-slides.pdf
url_paper: pubs/2025/kim_jenga.pdf
url_code: https://zenodo.org/records/17035153
---
4 changes: 2 additions & 2 deletions content/publication/lee-rtcon/index.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ authors:
tags: []
categories: []
date: '2026-02-01'
lastmod: 2025-12-05T10:31:20+09:00
lastmod: 2025-12-09T16:33:11+09:00
featured: false
draft: false

Expand All @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ image:
# E.g. `projects = ["internal-project"]` references `content/project/deep-learning/index.md`.
# Otherwise, set `projects = []`.
projects: []
publishDate: '2025-12-05T01:31:19.497188Z'
publishDate: '2025-12-09T07:33:11.478224Z'
publication_types:
- '0'
abstract: ''
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1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions static/pubs/2025/kim:crossx-abstract.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
The cross-cache attack is a fundamental component of modern Linux kernel exploits, spanning real-world attacks and recent research. Despite its importance, it is often regarded as unreliable due to its complex setup, and existing studies lack in-depth analysis of its mechanics. In this paper, we address this gap by: (1) reviewing public strategies and their limitations, (2) proposing two optimized strategies effective in varied conditions, and (3) introducing CROSS-X, an automated system that identifies suitable target objects for cross-cache attacks. We evaluated our strategies on a synthetic vulnerability and nine real-world CVEs, achieving over 99% and 85% success rates under idle and busy workloads, respectively. They also outperformed existing methods in 6 of 8 CVEs under idle workloads and 5 of 8 under busy workloads. For object identification, we define three key properties: (1) spray capability, (2) minimal interference, and (3) useful primitives. Based on these, CROSS-X identified seven versatile target objects and their relationship with interfering allocations. We believe our work will enhance public understanding of cross-cache attacks and contribute to improving Linux kernel security.
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