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99 changes: 44 additions & 55 deletions 05.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -1,43 +1,33 @@
NIP-05
======

Mapping Nostr keys to DNS-based internet identifiers
----------------------------------------------------
DNS-based identifiers
---------------------

`final` `optional`

On events of kind `0` (`user metadata`) one can specify the key `"nip05"` with an [internet identifier](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5322#section-3.4.1) (an email-like address) as the value. Although there is a link to a very liberal "internet identifier" specification above, the `<local-part>` part MUST only use characters `a-z0-9-_.`.
Users can declare their control over one or more DNS-based internet identifiers in kind `10008`.

Upon seeing that, the client splits the identifier into `<local-part>` and `<domain>` and use these values to make a GET request to `https://<domain>/.well-known/nostr.json?name=<local-part>`.

The result should be a JSON document object with a key `"names"` that should then be a mapping of names to hex formatted public keys, in lowercase. If the public key for the given `<name>` matches the `pubkey` from the `user metadata` event, the client then concludes that the given pubkey can indeed be referenced by its identifier.

### Example

If a client sees an event like this:

```jsonc
```yaml
{
"pubkey": "b0635d6a9851d3aed0cd6c495b282167acf761729078d975fc341b22650b07b9",
"kind": 0,
"content": "{\"name\": \"bob\", \"nip05\": \"bob@example.com\"}"
// other fields...
"kind": 10008,
"tags": [
["n", "<name>@<domain>"],
["n", "name@domain.com"],
["n", "name2@domain2.com"],
],
"content": "",
//...
}
```

It will make a GET request to `https://example.com/.well-known/nostr.json?name=bob` and get back a response that will look like
Internet identifiers follow [RFC-5322](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc5322#section-3.4.1) with the exception that `<name>`s MUST only use characters `a-z0-9-_.`.

```json
{
"names": {
"bob": "b0635d6a9851d3aed0cd6c495b282167acf761729078d975fc341b22650b07b9"
}
}
```
Supporting Clients split the identifier into `<name>` and `<domain>` and use these values to make a GET request to `https://<domain>/.well-known/nostr.json?name=<name>`.

or with the **recommended** `"relays"` attribute:
The result MUST be a JSON document with two properties: `names` and `relays`:

```json
```yaml
{
"names": {
"bob": "b0635d6a9851d3aed0cd6c495b282167acf761729078d975fc341b22650b07b9"
Expand All @@ -48,56 +38,55 @@ or with the **recommended** `"relays"` attribute:
}
```

If the pubkey matches the one given in `"names"` (as in the example above) that means the association is right and the `"nip05"` identifier is valid and can be displayed.
The property `names` MUST contain a map from names to lowercase hex-formatted public keys.

The recommended `"relays"` attribute may contain an object with public keys as properties and arrays of relay URLs as values. When present, that can be used to help clients learn in which relays the specific user may be found. Web servers which serve `/.well-known/nostr.json` files dynamically based on the query string SHOULD also serve the relays data for any name they serve in the same reply when that is available.
The property `relays` is optional, but when present, it MUST contain a map from pubkeys to an array of relay URLs where events for that key can be found.

## Finding users from their NIP-05 identifier
A valid NIP-05 identifier MUST match the resulting public key in the JSON to the pubkey of the `10008` event.

A client may implement support for finding users' public keys from _internet identifiers_, the flow is the same as above, but reversed: first the client fetches the _well-known_ URL and from there it gets the public key of the user, then it tries to fetch the kind `0` event for that user and check if it has a matching `"nip05"`.
A domain MAY offer the complete `https://<domain>/.well-known/nostr.json` with all names and relay information for all users.

## Notes
### Root Identifiers

### Identification, not verification
Clients MUST treat the identifier `_@<domain>` as the "root" identifier and MUST display it as just the `<domain>`. For example, if Bob owns `bob.com`, he may not want an identifier like `bob@bob.com` as that is redundant. Instead, Bob can use the identifier `_@bob.com` and expect Nostr clients to show and treat that as just `bob.com` for all purposes.

The NIP-05 is not intended to _verify_ a user, but only to _identify_ them, for the purpose of facilitating the exchange of a contact or their search.
Exceptions are people who own (e.g., a company) or are connected (e.g., a project) to a well-known domain, who can exploit NIP-05 as an attestation of their relationship with it, and thus to the organization behind it, thereby gaining an element of trust.
### Allowing access from JavaScript apps

### User discovery implementation suggestion
Servers MUST provide their `/.well-known/nostr.json` documents with the HTTP header `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` to ensure they can be validated by pure JS apps running in modern browsers, avoiding [CORS](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CORS) issues.

A client can use this to allow users to search other profiles. If a client has a search box or something like that, a user may be able to type "bob@example.com" there and the client would recognize that and do the proper queries to obtain a pubkey and suggest that to the user.
```bash
$ curl -sI https://example.com/.well-known/nostr.json?name=bob | grep -i ^Access-Control
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
```

### Clients must always follow public keys, not NIP-05 addresses
### Security Constraints

For example, if after finding that `bob@bob.com` has the public key `abc...def`, the user clicks a button to follow that profile, the client must keep a primary reference to `abc...def`, not `bob@bob.com`. If, for any reason, the address `https://bob.com/.well-known/nostr.json?name=bob` starts returning the public key `1d2...e3f` at any time in the future, the client must not replace `abc...def` in his list of followed profiles for the user (but it should stop displaying "bob@bob.com" for that user, as that will have become an invalid `"nip05"` property).
Servers MUST offer the `/.well-known/nostr.json` endpoint without any HTTP redirects.

### Public keys must be in hex format
Clients MUST ignore any HTTP redirects given by the `/.well-known/nostr.json` endpoint.

Keys must be returned in hex format, in lowercase. Keys in NIP-19 `npub` format are only meant to be used for display in client UIs, not in this NIP.
## Finding users from their NIP-05 identifier

### Showing just the domain as an identifier
A client may implement support for finding users' public keys from _internet identifiers_, the flow is the same as above, but reversed: first the client fetches the _well-known_ URL and from there it gets the public key of the user, then it tries to fetch the kind `10008` event for that user and check if it has a matching `n`-tags.

Clients may treat the identifier `_@domain` as the "root" identifier, and choose to display it as just the `<domain>`. For example, if Bob owns `bob.com`, he may not want an identifier like `bob@bob.com` as that is redundant. Instead, Bob can use the identifier `_@bob.com` and expect Nostr clients to show and treat that as just `bob.com` for all purposes.
## Notes

### Reasoning for the `/.well-known/nostr.json?name=<local-part>` format
### Identification, not verification

By adding the `<local-part>` as a query string instead of as part of the path, the protocol can support both dynamic servers that can generate JSON on-demand and static servers with a JSON file in it that may contain multiple names.
The NIP-05 is not intended to _verify_ a user, but only to _identify_ them, for the purpose of facilitating the exchange of a contact or their search. Exceptions are people who own (e.g., a company) or are connected (e.g., a project) to a well-known domain, who can exploit NIP-05 as an attestation of their relationship with it, and thus to the organization behind it, thereby gaining an element of trust.

### Allowing access from JavaScript apps
### User discovery implementation suggestion

JavaScript Nostr apps may be restricted by browser [CORS][] policies that prevent them from accessing `/.well-known/nostr.json` on the user's domain. When CORS prevents JS from loading a resource, the JS program sees it as a network failure identical to the resource not existing, so it is not possible for a pure-JS app to tell the user for certain that the failure was caused by a CORS issue. JS Nostr apps that see network failures requesting `/.well-known/nostr.json` files may want to recommend to users that they check the CORS policy of their servers, e.g.:
A client can use this to allow users to search other profiles. If a client has a search box or something like that, a user may be able to type "bob@example.com" there and the client would recognize that and do the proper queries to obtain a pubkey and suggest that to the user.

```bash
$ curl -sI https://example.com/.well-known/nostr.json?name=bob | grep -i ^Access-Control
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
```
### Clients must always follow public keys, not NIP-05 addresses

Users should ensure that their `/.well-known/nostr.json` is served with the HTTP header `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` to ensure it can be validated by pure JS apps running in modern browsers.
For example, if after finding that `bob@bob.com` has the public key `abc...def`, the user clicks a button to follow that profile, the client must keep a primary reference to `abc...def`, not `bob@bob.com`. If, for any reason, the address `https://bob.com/.well-known/nostr.json?name=bob` starts returning the public key `1d2...e3f` at any time in the future, the client must not replace `abc...def` in his list of followed profiles for the user (but it should stop displaying "bob@bob.com" for that user, as that will have become an invalid NIP-05 address).

[CORS]: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CORS
### Public keys must be in hex format

### Security Constraints
Keys must be returned in hex format, in lowercase. Keys in NIP-19 `npub` format are only meant to be used for display in client UIs, not in this NIP.

The `/.well-known/nostr.json` endpoint MUST NOT return any HTTP redirects.
### Reasoning for the `/.well-known/nostr.json?name=<name>` format

Fetchers MUST ignore any HTTP redirects given by the `/.well-known/nostr.json` endpoint.
By adding the `<name>` as a query string instead of as part of the path, the protocol can support both dynamic servers that can generate JSON on demand and static servers with a JSON file in it that may contain multiple names.
2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion README.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ They exist to document what may be implemented by [Nostr](https://github.com/nos
- [NIP-02: Follow List](02.md)
- [NIP-03: OpenTimestamps Attestations for Events](03.md)
- [NIP-04: Encrypted Direct Message](04.md) --- **unrecommended**: deprecated in favor of [NIP-17](17.md)
- [NIP-05: Mapping Nostr keys to DNS-based internet identifiers](05.md)
- [NIP-05: DNS-based identifiers](05.md)
- [NIP-06: Basic key derivation from mnemonic seed phrase](06.md)
- [NIP-07: `window.nostr` capability for web browsers](07.md)
- [NIP-08: Handling Mentions](08.md) --- **unrecommended**: deprecated in favor of [NIP-27](27.md)
Expand Down