Fix possible fix(deps): 12 vulnerable dependencies in go.mod - #706
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begininvoke
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September 15, 2026 06:43
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Small change to
go.mod— a scan flagged the code below and it looked genuine. It is around line 1.CRITICAL — Authorization bypass in google.golang.org/grpc (CVE-2026-33186), affecting installed version v1.68.1 in go.mod. The gRPC-Go server's HTTP/2 routing is too lenient: it accepts requests whose
:pathpseudo-header omits the mandatory leading slash (e.g.,Service/Methodinstead of/Service/Method) and still routes them to the correct handler. However, authorization interceptors — including the officialgoogle.golang.org/grpc/authzRBAC interceptor and any custom interceptor that inspectsinfo.FullMethodorgrpc.Method(ctx)— evaluate the raw, non-canonical path. As a result, 'deny' rules written against canonical paths (starting with '/') never match these malformed requests, and if the policy contains a fallback 'allow' rule, the request is permitted. Impact: an attacker who can send raw HTTP/2 frames directly to the gRPC server can invoke methods that the path-based authorization policy is supposed to deny, resulting in a complete authorization bypass. Exploitability requires the server to (a) use path-based authz interceptors and (b) have specific deny rules with a default-allow fallback. Risk level: CRITICAL. Remediation: upgrade to v1.79.3, which rejects any:pathlacking a leading slash withcodes.Unimplementedbefore it reaches authorization interceptors or handlers. If an immediate upgrade is not possible, apply mitigations such as a validating interceptor that rejects non-canonical paths, infrastructure-level path normalization, or policy hardening (e.g., default-deny fallback).Updates vulnerable dependencies to recommended versions, covering the reported CVEs.
For reference: rule
CVE-2026-33186. Rated critical.I may well be missing context here — if the current code is deliberate, feel free to close this.
Found with automated scanning (RedGem) and reviewed before opening. If it is not useful, closing it is completely fine.