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62 changes: 38 additions & 24 deletions tests/weak_integration.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -290,60 +290,74 @@ fn test_server_mode() {

/// Test for Host header security (Issue #57)
/// Verifies that httpjail corrects mismatched Host headers to prevent
/// CloudFlare and other CDN routing bypasses.
/// CDN routing bypasses and other Host header attacks.
///
/// This test uses httpbin.org/headers which echoes back the received headers,
/// allowing us to verify that httpjail corrects the Host header to match the
/// actual destination URL rather than relying on external service blocking behavior.
#[test]
fn test_host_header_security() {
use std::process::Command;

// Test with Cloudflare's trace endpoint that clearly shows the Host header
let curl_args = vec![
"-s",
"-H",
"Host: evil.com",
"--max-time",
"3",
"http://www.cloudflare.com/cdn-cgi/trace",
];

// Test 1: Direct curl execution (without httpjail) - Cloudflare blocks mismatched Host
// Test 1: Direct curl with mismatched Host header
// httpbin.org/headers echoes back all headers it receives
let direct_result = Command::new("curl")
.args(&curl_args)
.args([
"-s",
"-H",
"Host: evil.com",
"--max-time",
"5",
"http://httpbin.org/headers",
])
.output()
.expect("Failed to execute curl directly");

let direct_stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&direct_result.stdout);
// Cloudflare returns an error code (1034) for mismatched Host headers

// Verify curl sends the mismatched Host header as-is
assert!(
direct_stdout.contains("error code: 1034"),
"Direct curl with mismatched Host header should be blocked by Cloudflare with error 1034 (got: {})",
direct_stdout.contains("\"Host\": \"evil.com\"")
|| direct_stdout.contains("\"Host\":\"evil.com\""),
"Direct curl should send mismatched Host header (got: {})",
direct_stdout
);

// Test 2: Same curl command through httpjail - should correct the Host header
let httpjail_result = HttpjailCommand::new()
.weak()
.js("true") // Allow all requests
.command(vec!["curl"].into_iter().chain(curl_args.clone()).collect())
.command(vec![
"curl",
"-s",
"-H",
"Host: evil.com",
"--max-time",
"5",
"http://httpbin.org/headers",
])
.execute();

assert!(httpjail_result.is_ok(), "Httpjail request should complete");
let (exit_code, stdout, _) = httpjail_result.unwrap();
assert_eq!(exit_code, 0, "Httpjail request should succeed");

// Httpjail should have corrected the Host header, allowing the request to succeed
// Verify httpjail corrected the Host header to match the actual destination
assert!(
stdout.contains("h=www.cloudflare.com"),
"Httpjail should correct the Host header to www.cloudflare.com, allowing the request (got: {})",
stdout.contains("\"Host\": \"httpbin.org\"") || stdout.contains("\"Host\":\"httpbin.org\""),
"Httpjail should correct Host header to httpbin.org (got: {})",
stdout
);

// Verify the mismatched header was NOT forwarded
assert!(
!stdout.contains("error code: 1034"),
"Httpjail-corrected request should not be blocked by Cloudflare (got: {})",
!stdout.contains("\"Host\": \"evil.com\"") && !stdout.contains("\"Host\":\"evil.com\""),
"Httpjail should not forward mismatched Host header evil.com (got: {})",
stdout
);

// This demonstrates that httpjail prevents the Host header bypass attack
// that would otherwise be possible with direct curl execution
// This demonstrates that httpjail prevents Host header bypass attacks
// by correcting the Host header to match the actual destination URL
}

// The proc/JS parity tests have been moved to tests/json_parity.rs
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